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ARTICLE 
Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Doctrine: Four Forms of 
Constitutional Ineffectiveness 
Eve Brensike Primus* 
Abstract. For years, experts have blamed Strickland v. Washington ’s lax standard for 
assessing trial attorney effectiveness for many of the criminal justice system’s problems. 
But the conventional understanding of Strickland as a problem for ineffectiveness claims 
gives the decision too much prominence because it treats Strickland as the test for all such 
claims. That is a mistake. Properly understood, the Supreme Court has recognized four 
different constitutional forms of trial attorney ineffectiveness, and Strickland ’s two-
pronged test applies to only one of the four. If litigants and courts would notice this 
complexity and relegate Strickland to its proper place, it would pave the way for 
meritorious ineffectiveness claims of the other three kinds. This Article disaggregates 
strands of Sixth Amendment doctrine that others have jumbled together to enable courts 
and litigants to confine Strickland to its proper domain and use more appropriate analyses 
elsewhere. 
The Article also explains why additional disaggregation is necessary within the category 
of cases where Strickland rightly applies. Implicitly, the Supreme Court has created not one 
but three tests for assessing deficient performance within that domain, and it has indicated 
a willingness to soften the outcome-determinative prejudice prong as well. Failure to 
recognize these different forms of Strickland ineffectiveness has made the test seem much 
harder for defendants to satisfy than needs to be true. Recognizing these complexities, and 
applying the right test in the right case, is necessary if individual defendants are to be 
treated fairly and systemic constitutional problems in the provision of indigent defense 
services are to be addressed. 
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Introduction 
Indigent defense features a paradox. Everyone knows that the conditions 
under which indigent defense services are provided often make effective 
representation impossible.1 Public defender caseloads are too high for any 
attorney to manage effectively.2 Some public defenders must meet clients for 
the first time in court, having had no opportunity to investigate or research 
their cases.3 Judges often pressure public defenders to process cases quickly 
through the system and sometimes affirmatively punish defenders for filing 
motions or asserting their clients’ rights.4 These problems are notorious and 
 
 1. For years, scholars and judges have described these problems. See, e.g., McFarland v. 
Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1256-61 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari) (noting how the legal counsel provided to indigent defendants was 
“woefully inadequate” and cataloguing the problem in capital cases); David L. Bazelon, 
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (“[W]hat I have seen in 23 
years on the bench leads me to believe that a great many—if not most—indigent 
defendants do not receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 
6th Amendment.”); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Essay, Fifty Years of Defiance and 
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152-55 (2013) (describing 
how the right to effective assistance of counsel is routinely violated around the 
country in criminal cases); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a 
Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 
413, 431-32 (1988) (collecting data from judicial surveys indicating that judges believe 
that many criminal defense attorneys who appear in their courtrooms are 
incompetent). 
 2. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public Defense, in REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE—VOLUME 3: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 121, 123-24 (Erik Luna 
ed., 2017) (collecting studies and statistics); Samantha Jaffe, Note, “It’s Not You, It’s Your 
Caseload”: Using Cronic to Solve Indigent Defense Underfunding, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 
1475-76 (2018) (noting that defenders in Atlanta have on average 59 minutes to spend 
on a case; defenders in Detroit have only 32 minutes per case; and defenders in New 
Orleans have only 7 minutes per case). 
 3. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON ’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 16-19 
(2004), https://perma.cc/WG55-D6Z2; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR 
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR 
COURTS 23, 30-36 (2009), https://perma.cc/NC7V-Q5Z6; NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, 
EVALUATION OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN MICHIGAN: A RACE TO THE 
BOTTOM 1, 19, 29 (2008), https://perma.cc/DLC2-Q27K; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 49-101 (2009), https://perma.cc/J6AM-DEJH (describing the 
problems in indigent defense delivery systems around the country, including a lack of 
sufficient funding, high caseloads, a lack of independence, and inadequate training and 
supervision). 
 4. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Address, Independence of Counsel: An Essential Requirement for 
Competent Counsel and a Working Adversary System, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 853, 882 (2018) 
(noting how attorneys are pushed to follow judges’ needs and desires for fear of losing 
their jobs if they upset judges); Charlie Gerstein, Dependent Counsel, 16 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 147, 162-65 (2020) (discussing how judges pressure and punish defenders). 
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well documented,5 and they frequently preclude effective representation. But—
and here is the paradox—the number of cases where judges have deemed trial 
defenders constitutionally ineffective is vanishingly small.6 Why? 
The standard answer blames Strickland v. Washington.7 Under that decision’s 
two-pronged test, a criminal defendant arguing that his or her trial attorney’s 
performance was constitutionally ineffective must show both that the trial 
attorney performed unreasonably given prevailing norms of practice and that 
the trial attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.8 But on the 
first prong, courts regularly presume that defense attorney actions that might 
seem to reflect attorney incompetence actually reflect deliberate, strategic 
 
 5. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 6. See, e.g., NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS 5, 9-10 (2007), https://perma.cc/G9SF-FM8M (noting that a majority 
of federal habeas petitions filed in district courts raise ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims but that grant rates are exceedingly low); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(a) n.49 (West 2019) (collecting additional studies); Stephanos 
Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 & n.5 (describing one study of 4,000 state and federal 
appellate decisions and noting that the courts found ineffective assistance in only about 
3.9% of cases); Adam Lamparello, Establishing Guidelines for Attorney Representation of 
Criminal Defendants at the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 ME. L. REV. 97, 135-37 
(2010) (collecting statistics and finding that “courts remain[] reluctant to grant relief to 
defendants claiming ineffective assistance”). 
 7. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Essay, Gideon 
Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2138-39 (2013) (describing Strickland as “a formidable 
obstacle to defendants alleging that they were deprived of their Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel”); Paul Marcus, The United States Supreme 
Court (Mostly) Gives Up Its Review Role with Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 1745, 1765 (2016) (describing how the Strickland standard makes it “so 
very difficult” to obtain relief); id. at 1765-66 (collecting scholars’ and courts’ statements 
describing and lamenting the Strickland standard). The Strickland standard is not the 
only reason why it is difficult to raise and win such claims. Scholars have also noted 
that there are procedural barriers to reviewing ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claims. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance—
Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647, 656 & nn.29-30 (2013) (discussing how 
prosecutors extract and courts enforce waivers of the right to claim ineffective trial 
attorney representation as part of plea bargaining); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural 
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 679, 688-97 (2007) (arguing that locating ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claims in collateral proceedings undermines defendants’ abilities to raise these claims); 
Gray Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State and Federal 
Courts, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 239, 240-43 (2011) (discussing restrictions on raising 
ineffectiveness challenges, including retroactivity barriers, statutes of limitations, the 
prohibition on second or successive petitions, procedural default doctrines, deferential 
standards of review, and limits on obtaining evidentiary hearings). 
 8. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-96. 
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choices by counsel.9 And on the second prong, courts are loath to find that any 
trial errors actually cause outcome-determinative prejudice.10 All in all, experts 
lament, the way that courts apply Strickland makes claims of ineffective 
assistance nearly impossible to win.11 
It is true that Strickland claims are hard to win. But the standard 
understanding of Strickland as a problem for ineffectiveness claims gives 
Strickland too much prominence because it treats Strickland as the test for all 
such claims. That is a mistake. Properly understood, the Supreme Court has 
recognized four different constitutional forms of trial attorney ineffectiveness, 
and Strickland ’s two-pronged test applies to only one of the four. If litigants 
and courts would notice this complexity and relegate Strickland to its proper 
place, it would pave the way for meritorious ineffectiveness claims of the other 
three kinds. 
In this Article, I distinguish and name the four forms of constitutional 
ineffectiveness. Ineffectiveness can be either structural or personal. It can also be 
either episodic or pervasive. These two distinctions interact. Attorney 
ineffectiveness can be structural and episodic, or structural and pervasive, or 
personal and episodic, or personal and pervasive. Below, I explain the 
differences among these four forms of ineffectiveness. Strickland ’s two-pronged 
test, properly understood, applies only to the episodic personal form. By 
demonstrating that ineffectiveness also takes other forms, this analysis can 
help litigants and courts apply the appropriate test to different kinds of 
ineffectiveness claims, rather than lumping them all together under 
Strickland.12 
 
 9. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the 
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 633-34 
(1986) (“The primary reason appellate courts give for denying ineffective assistance 
claims is that the court does not wish to second-guess a lawyer’s decisions concerning 
proper trial strategy or tactics.”); Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 
1786-87 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY 
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 
(1998)) (noting that “a lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective”). 
 10. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Editor’s Observations, Vindicating the Right to Counsel, 25 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 87, 87 (2012) (“Strickland ’s prejudice prong has proven to be a formidable 
obstacle in vindicating the right to counsel.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—
A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 12 (1986) (arguing that the Strickland standard 
“announced a constitutional right to reasonably competent lawyering but promptly 
proceeded to strip the right of any force”); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (1999) (describing Strickland as 
“a disaster of constitutional proportions” (capitalization altered)). 
 12. I am not the first to discuss the importance of disentangling different strands of 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. In Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance 
of Counsel, Sanjay Chhablani sought to distinguish the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel from the due process right to counsel. See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling 
footnote continued on next page 
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A structurally ineffective trial attorney is ineffective not due to some fault 
of her own but rather by virtue of outside forces that operate on her.13 This 
form of ineffectiveness stems from sources external to the trial attorney 
herself. For example, a trial judge can make it impossible for defense counsel to 
do her job properly by interfering with counsel’s ability to consult with her 
client14 or preventing counsel from presenting arguments to the court.15 
Structural ineffectiveness can also be the product of the indigent defense 
delivery system. If an attorney must handle 19,000 cases in a year (which would 
give her only seven minutes for the average case),16 it does not matter how 
qualified she is or how hard she is willing to work. She cannot provide 
effective assistance of counsel when the system gives her so little time.17 
Alternatively, an attorney is personally ineffective if the failure to provide 
competent trial representation is attributable to the lawyer herself. This form 
of ineffectiveness is internal to the defense attorney rather than imposed on 
her by an external source. For example, there are lawyers who sleep through 
trial,18 abuse alcohol and drugs while representing defendants,19 or fail to do 
 
the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2009). My focus is 
different. Instead of discussing the relationship between due process and the Sixth 
Amendment, I argue that courts should recognize and disaggregate the tests for the 
four different forms of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that exist under the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
 13. My use of the word “structural” here differs from the Supreme Court’s when it 
describes structural versus harmless error on direct appeal. See, e.g., Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (describing the difference between trial errors 
that are subject to harmless error review and structural errors that defy harmless error 
analysis). Structural error, in the Supreme Court’s view, “affect[s] the framework 
within which the trial proceeds” and “transcends the criminal process.” Id. at 309-11. 
Structural ineffectiveness as I describe it is trial attorney ineffectiveness that is not 
attributable to the defense attorney herself but rather is caused by the state’s structure 
or other state actors in that structure. Some forms of structural ineffectiveness defy 
harmless error analysis and are structural errors that will result in automatic reversal 
on appeal. See infra Part I.A. Other forms of structural ineffectiveness are subject to 
harmless error analysis because they are more isolated. See infra Part I.B. 
 14. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87-89 (1976). 
 15. See, e.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856, 862-65 (1975). 
 16. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 3, at 21 (explaining that part-
time defenders in New Orleans are “handling the equivalent of almost 19,000 cases per 
year per attorney, which literally limits them to seven minutes per case”); see also 
sources cited supra note 2. 
 17. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56-59 (1932). 
 18. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 19. See Paul Duggan, George W. Bush: The Record in Texas, WASH. POST (May 12, 2000), 
https://perma.cc/786W-P8U7. 
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basic legal research or factual investigation.20 In many of these cases, the trial 
attorney’s ineffectiveness is not the fault of the system. It is a failing of the 
particular lawyer.21 
The difference between personal and structural ineffectiveness goes to the 
cause of an attorney’s deficient performance: Does the deficiency result from a 
flaw in the specific attorney or from something about the system?22 The other 
distinction I introduce here, between episodic and pervasive ineffectiveness, goes 
not to the cause of deficient performance but rather to its breadth in a 
particular defendant’s case. A trial attorney who misunderstands a point of law 
and therefore fails to file a motion to suppress evidence is in that respect 
ineffective, but that ineffectiveness might be an isolated occurrence within a 
proceeding where the attorney otherwise does a good job. I use the term 
“episodic” to describe such discrete episodes of deficient performance. In 
contrast, if an attorney fails to show up for trial at all, the ineffectiveness is 
pervasive. It shapes the entire proceeding rather than a discrete thing within it. 
Two points about the distinction between episodic and pervasive 
ineffectiveness bear emphasis here. First, episodic and pervasive ineffectiveness 
exist along a continuum. If a proceeding features many instances of episodic 
ineffectiveness, the ineffectiveness at some point becomes pervasive. Suppose 
an attorney does not meet with her client, fails to investigate the case, presents 
 
 20. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari) (“Capital defendants have been sentenced to death when 
represented by counsel who never bothered to read the state death penalty statute . . . .”); 
Bright & Sanneh, supra note 1, at 2166-70 (collecting examples); Sanjay K. Chhablani, 
Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 383-89 (2009) (same). 
 21. A defense lawyer can be both personally and structurally ineffective in the same 
criminal case if, for example, the judge interferes with her ability to conduct the trial 
(rendering her structurally ineffective), and she is high on drugs during her 
representation of the client (rendering her personally ineffective). The judge’s 
interference would be analyzed under the structural ineffectiveness line of cases and 
the attorney’s drugged state under the personal ineffectiveness line. 
 22. Admittedly, some outward displays of incompetence that initially appear to be 
examples of personal ineffectiveness might be symptoms that flow from forms of 
structural ineffectiveness. See infra Part II.  
  Of course, all trial attorney ineffectiveness is attributable to the government in a sense. 
See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (“Unless a defendant charged with a 
serious offense has counsel able to invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards 
that distinguish our system of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself. 
When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it is the State that 
unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty.” (citations omitted)). Here, I 
mean a different kind of attribution that is more directly causal. I am not asking if 
there is sufficient action attributable to the state or federal government to satisfy the 
state action requirement. Rather, I am asking about the root cause of the trial attorney’s 
deficient performance: Did the government prevent the attorney from performing 
effectively, or was the failure the fault of the attorney herself? 
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neither an opening statement nor a closing argument, and examines no 
witnesses at trial. At some point, the attorney’s ineffective performance is 
better understood as a constructive denial of counsel throughout the 
proceeding, and it makes sense to think of the ineffectiveness as pervasive 
rather than merely episodic. In this respect, the episodic-pervasive distinction 
is unlike the personal-structural distinction: Personal ineffectiveness does not 
become structural by sheer multiplication. 
Second, the question whether ineffectiveness is episodic or pervasive is 
different from the question whether a defendant was prejudiced by an 
attorney’s performance. The prejudice analysis asks about the effects of an error.23 
In contrast, the difference between episodic and pervasive ineffectiveness is 
not a matter of effects. Episodic ineffectiveness can be just as damaging as 
pervasive ineffectiveness. Instead, the distinction between episodic and 
pervasive ineffectiveness is a matter of the breadth of ineffective performance 
within the overall proceeding. Did the attorney perform deficiently with 
respect to a particular thing, or was the deficient performance a feature of most 
or all of the proceeding? 
The four forms of trial attorney ineffectiveness can thus be represented in 
a two-by-two matrix: 
  
 
 23. See Justin Murray, Prejudice-Based Rights in Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 
282-84 (2020) (discussing how prejudice is an element of various criminal procedure 
analyses). 
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 Personal Structural 
Episodic 
Definition: An isolated instance of 
trial attorney ineffectiveness that 




 Defense attorney fails to object 
to inadmissible evidence 
because the attorney simply 
missed that it was inadmissible 
or was not paying attention. 
 Defense attorney fails to file a 
pretrial motion to suppress or 
exclude evidence due to an 
erroneous understanding of the 
applicable law. 
Definition: An isolated instance of 
trial attorney ineffectiveness that 
is attributable to the government 
or the structure of the system. 
 
Examples: 
 State denies defendant an 
attorney at a postindictment, 
pretrial lineup. 
 State denies defendant an 
attorney for a matter of 
moments during an 
insignificant part of a trial. 
Pervasive 
Definition: Trial attorney 
ineffectiveness that is attributable 
to the trial attorney herself and 




 Defense attorney is drunk or 
sleeping throughout the trial. 
 Defense attorney does not 
investigate, make arguments, 
or question witnesses at trial 
despite having the opportunity 
to do so. 
Definition: Trial attorney 
ineffectiveness that is attributable 
to the government or the structure 




 Judge denies defendant an 
attorney altogether. 
 High caseloads prevent defense 
attorney from being able to 
meet client pretrial, investigate 
the case, research, or present a 
defense. 
 
Properly understood, the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel jurisprudence recognizes these four different forms of trial attorney 
ineffectiveness (albeit without these labels).24 It also recognizes that there  
are different tests for determining when trial attorney ineffectiveness is 
constitutionally problematic depending on which form of ineffectiveness is at 
issue. Only episodic personal ineffectiveness is governed by the narrow, two-
 
 24. For a mapping of Supreme Court cases into these four categories, see the Appendix. 
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pronged Strickland test. The test’s doctrinal requirements simply do not make 
sense as applied to instances of structural or pervasive ineffectiveness. 
Unfortunately, some courts and litigants have treated Strickland as if it 
were applicable to ineffectiveness claims generally rather than to a specific 
kind of ineffectiveness claim.25 That error threatens to underenforce the right 
to effective trial counsel on the whole because data from the last three decades 
suggest that many of the problems in criminal defense representation in this 
country are structural, not personal.26 To attempt to remedy those problems 
with a tool designed for redressing episodic instances of personal 
ineffectiveness is, at best, to play whack-a-mole with the Sixth Amendment. It 
prevents lower courts from addressing structural problems in states’ indigent 
defense delivery systems.27 
I have two aims in this Article. First, I distinguish the different forms of 
ineffective assistance so as to enable courts and litigants to confine Strickland to 
its proper domain and use more appropriate analyses elsewhere. This project 
involves disaggregating strands of Sixth Amendment doctrine that others have 
jumbled together. 
Second, I show that further disaggregation is necessary within the 
category of episodic personal ineffectiveness where Strickland applies. Many 
lower courts and scholars, in addition to improperly pushing all 
ineffectiveness claims into the Strickland box, apply the harshest and most 
 
 25. For example, some courts will consider whether counsel’s failures were strategic even 
when the type of ineffectiveness alleged is structural. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 780 
S.E.2d 835, 839, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (suggesting that a defense attorney’s failure to 
call two witnesses might have been strategic even though the defendant had raised a 
structural ineffectiveness claim on appeal alleging that the trial judge had erroneously 
failed to grant a defense request for a continuance after defense counsel had petitioned 
the trial court to produce those two witnesses and the court had failed to produce 
them). Other courts improperly graft Strickland ’s prejudice requirement onto 
pervasive structural errors. See, e.g., Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 362-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1996) (rejecting the petitioners’ pervasive structural ineffectiveness argument for 
failure to demonstrate specific prejudice under Strickland). For a more extended 
discussion of this problem, see Part II below. 
 26. See sources cited supra note 3; see also infra Part II. 
 27. Sometimes structural problems in indigent defense delivery systems are systemic 
problems that exist across all cases. Other times, they are one-off problems that occur 
in individual cases. The two-by-two matrix above assumes (as Supreme Court doctrine 
dictates) that the courts’ ineffectiveness analyses are conducted on an individualized, 
case-by-case basis. That does not mean that these individual cases cannot be leveraged 
to effectuate systemic change when the structural problems are systemwide. Pretrial 
class actions seeking structural reform are one way to effectuate such sweeping change. 
See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing such cases). Recurring 
posttrial remedies can also be used to catalyze systemic change. See generally Eve 
Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(discussing how individualized, posttrial habeas challenges can promote systemic 
change). 
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state-friendly version of the Strickland test to all ineffectiveness challenges.28 In 
so doing, they fail to recognize that the Strickland test itself is multilayered and 
not always so state friendly. 
Although the Supreme Court has denied that there is a checklist for 
assessing trial attorney performance under Strickland,29 it has adopted a de 
facto checklist for certain kinds of ineffectiveness challenges.30 In fact, there 
are three different tests for assessing trial attorney performance within 
Strickland, and two of those tests are much easier for defendants to satisfy than 
scholars and lower courts have assumed.31 Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
recently indicated a willingness to soften the outcome-determinative-prejudice 
inquiry, and some states have already taken steps in that direction.32 
Recognizing and disentangling the different layers of the Strickland test for 
episodic personal ineffectiveness is important for providing an adequate check 
on poor attorney performance, preventing the wrongful conviction of 
innocent people, and ensuring the procedural fairness necessary to generate 
respect for the legal system and its results.33 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the development of the 
four forms of ineffectiveness in Supreme Court doctrine. That development 
began with a focus on structural ineffectiveness and later began to address 
personal ineffectiveness. Once both concerns became a part of the doctrine, the 
Court’s 1984 decisions in Strickland v. Washington34 and United States v. Cronic35 
recognized the four different forms of trial attorney ineffectiveness—but the 
Court did not label them or discuss their different tests as clearly as it could 
have. Part I clarifies that doctrine. 
Part II explores how and why the Supreme Court has focused primarily on 
episodic personal ineffectiveness since Strickland and Cronic were decided. That 
focus has in turn prompted litigants, scholars, and lower courts to focus on 
Strickland as the dominant test for trial attorney ineffectiveness. For reasons I 
explain, this myopic focus on Strickland, and on episodic personal ineffectiveness 
more generally, is problematic. 
Part III revisits structural ineffectiveness in its episodic and pervasive 
forms, explaining how these branches of the doctrine have evolved in some 
lower courts and how they provide underappreciated opportunities to address 
 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984). 
 30. See infra Part IV.A. 
 31. See infra Parts IV.A.1-.3. 
 32. See infra Part IV.B. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. 466 U.S. 668. 
 35. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
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systemic problems of trial attorney ineffectiveness. Part IV then conducts a 
parallel analysis for personal ineffectiveness, again in both its episodic and 
pervasive forms. I explain how lower courts and litigants applying Strickland 
have improperly conflated three different tests for assessing trial attorney 
performance, discuss how recent Supreme Court case law opens the door to 
broader review of personal ineffectiveness challenges, and explain why such 
broader review is important. The Article then concludes by encouraging 
litigants, courts, and scholars to think more carefully about the different forms 
of ineffectiveness when discussing the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
I. The Path to Four Forms of Trial Attorney Ineffectiveness 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on criminal defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to effective trial counsel has not been a model of clarity. 
Between 1932 and 1984, the Court’s thinking evolved significantly. The Court 
began that period with a focus on cases involving states’ flat refusal to appoint 
counsel for indigent defendants.36 In the scheme this Article presents, those 
cases involved ineffective assistance that was both structural (because its source 
was the states) and pervasive (because the denial of counsel was complete). 
Gradually, the Court also came to consider cases involving partial denials of 
counsel—in this Article’s terms, cases where ineffective assistance was 
structural and episodic.37 It took almost forty years from the Court’s initial 
rulings on structural ineffectiveness for the Court to begin recognizing personal 
ineffectiveness claims.38 But once it did, it was not long before the Court 
recognized personal ineffectiveness in both its episodic and pervasive forms. 
Even at the end of this process, the Court never fully articulated the four 
categories of ineffectiveness that its cases recognized. But by 1984, when the 
Court decided Strickland v. Washington39 and United States v. Cronic,40 the four 
different forms of constitutional ineffectiveness were visible in the Court’s 
decisions. 
A. An Initial Focus on Pervasive Structural Ineffectiveness 
The Supreme Court’s initial rulings on the scope of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel dealt with complete denials of that right. In the 1930s, many 
state and federal courts required indigent criminal defendants to plead guilty 
 
 36. See infra Part I.A. 
 37. See infra Part I.B. 
 38. See infra Part I.C. 
 39. 466 U.S. 668. 
 40. 466 U.S. 648. 
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or go to trial without ever having an opportunity to consult with an 
attorney.41 In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the 
power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or 
waives the assistance of counsel.”42 The Court later extended the right to 
appointed counsel to defendants in state-court prosecutions that would result 
in actual jail time.43 And criminal defendants whose rights under these cases 
were violated did not have to demonstrate prejudice: Convictions obtained in 
cases where defendants were denied counsel at trial or when taking a plea were 
subject to automatic reversal.44 
The government’s complete denial of an attorney to an indigent defendant 
is the quintessential example of a pervasive structural ineffectiveness problem. 
The problem is structural rather than personal because it stems from the 
government. It is pervasive rather than episodic because counsel is denied for 
the entire course of the proceedings. In such cases, there is no need to 
demonstrate prejudice because “[p]rejudice in these circumstances is so likely 
that case-by-case inquiry . . . is not worth the cost.”45 After all, the Court has 
noted that a criminal defendant without an attorney “lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense”46 and face the “intricacies of the 
law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.”47 Without counsel, the 
defendant “may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible.”48 Moreover, the “impairment[] of the Sixth Amendment right . . . 
[is] easy to identify,” the government is directly responsible for the problem, 
 
 41. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459-60 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
49-50, 52-53, 56 (1932); see also, e.g., Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
15, 28-30 (2016) (describing how indigent defense delivery operated on a charity model 
before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and noting that half of Massachusetts 
defendants appeared in court on their own as a result). 
 42. 304 U.S. at 463 (footnote omitted). 
 43. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338-39, 343-45 (applying the right to defendants charged with 
felonies); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (extending the Gideon 
right to counsel to alleged misdemeanants facing jail sentences). But cf. Scott v. Illinois, 
440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (limiting Argersinger and holding that there is a constitutional 
right to counsel only if the defendant faces actual, as opposed to potential, 
imprisonment upon conviction). 
 44. See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1945); 
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1945). 
 45. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). 
 46. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
 47. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973). 
 48. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
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and the violation is “easy for the government to prevent.”49 So when counsel is 
denied at trial (or when a defendant pleads guilty), the ineffectiveness is 
structural and pervasive, and convictions are automatically reversed without 
any need for the defendant to demonstrate prejudice. 
The foregoing analysis applies most easily in cases where counsel is 
actually completely denied. But early on, the Supreme Court recognized that 
pervasive structural ineffectiveness could also be constructive. Consider Powell v. 
Alabama.50 In that case, seven poor, black men were accused of raping two 
white women.51 The trial judge did not appoint counsel, instead relying on “all 
the members of the bar” who were present to assist as needed.52 In three 
separate trials, each lasting a day, the defendants were all convicted and 
sentenced to death.53 The Supreme Court held that the defendants’ rights to 
counsel had been violated even though attorneys were technically present to 
represent them in the courtroom on the day of the trial.54 As the Court noted: 
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these 
defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning 
of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation 
were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real 
sense . . . .55 
Two lawyers offered to help at trial, but their “appearance was . . . pro forma.”56 
The attorneys were present, but they were not willing or able to act as 
advocates for the defendants. As the Court later put it, the appointment of 
counsel in such circumstances is “a sham and nothing more than a formal 
compliance with the Constitution’s requirement that an accused be given the 
assistance of counsel. The Constitution’s guarantee of assistance of counsel 
cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment.”57 
 
 49. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
 50. 287 U.S. 45. 
 51. Id. at 49-51. 
 52. Id. at 56-57. 
 53. Id. at 49-50. 
 54. Id. at 53-56, 68-71. 
 55. Id. at 57. Powell was decided as a due process case because the Supreme Court had not yet 
incorporated the Sixth Amendment against the states, but it was later understood as a 
right to counsel case. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963). 
 56. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57-58 (quoting Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 214 (Ala. 1932) (Anderson, 
C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 287 U.S. 45). 
 57. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (footnote omitted); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“That a person who happens to be a lawyer is 
present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy the constitutional 
command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel 
because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the 
adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an 
footnote continued on next page 
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Another common scenario in early cases finding pervasive structural 
ineffectiveness featured trial courts requiring criminal defense attorneys to 
represent codefendants simultaneously, even when the defense attorneys 
claimed that joint representation would pose conflicts of interest. In Holloway v. 
Arkansas, the defense attorney objected to his appointment to represent three 
codefendants facing charges of robbery and rape on the ground that the 
defendants had mutually adverse interests.58 All three wanted to testify, and 
their shared counsel could not possibly simultaneously represent them all 
without a conflict.59 The trial court denied the request to appoint separate 
counsel for the three defendants, and the Supreme Court held that the 
defendants’ rights to effective assistance of counsel had been violated.60 The 
violation was structural because it was forced on the defendants by the court. 
And it was pervasive because the conflict of interest 
may well have precluded defense counsel . . . from exploring possible plea 
negotiations . . . . Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney 
from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps 
favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative 
involvement and culpability of [the] clients in order to minimize the culpability 
of one by emphasizing that of another.61 
In short, the conflict of interest infected the attorney’s performance 
throughout the proceedings. And as in the cases featuring complete denials of 
the right to counsel, the Supreme Court in the conflict-of-interest scenario 
presumed prejudice rather than requiring that it be specifically demonstrated.62 
As these cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court’s first interventions 
focused on structural actions by the court system that resulted in the complete 
and total denial of representation (actual or constructive). Once a complete 
denial of counsel was detected, prejudice was presumed, and the defendant was 
entitled to a new trial. 
 
attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that 
the trial is fair.”); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 763-64 (1945) (per curiam) (“[I]t is a 
denial of the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial to force him to trial with such 
expedition as to deprive him of the effective aid and assistance of counsel.”). 
 58. 435 U.S. 475, 476-77 (1978). 
 59. Id. at 477-81. 
 60. Id. at 484, 489-91. 
 61. Id. at 490. 
 62. Id. at 490-91 (noting that a rule requiring the defendants to show prejudice in specific 
ways “would not be susceptible of intelligent, even-handed application” and that 
determining what impact a conflict of interest had on “the attorney’s options, tactics, 
and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible”); see also Mickens v. 
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168, 173-74 (2002) (limiting the automatic prejudice presumption 
to structural cases). 
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B. The Move to Episodic Structural Ineffectiveness 
The scenario of pervasive structural ineffectiveness presents a relatively 
straightforward violation of the right to counsel, and the Court’s response was 
similarly simple: The complete denial of the right to counsel, whether actual or 
constructive, entitled defendants to new trials without the need to 
demonstrate specific prejudice. But once the Supreme Court began enforcing 
the right to counsel in this way, subtler questions naturally arose. For example, 
what if a trial court appointed counsel but limited that counsel’s involvement 
at specific points in the trial? What if counsel was present at trial but the trial 
court (or the justice system more broadly) denied the defendant access to 
counsel at a critical pretrial stage? Judges, legislators, and executive officials 
who were hostile to the Court’s recognition in Gideon of a right to appointed 
counsel found creative ways to limit counsel’s involvement.63 Their actions 
raised the possibility of ineffectiveness that was structural but episodic rather 
than pervasive. Soon after the Supreme Court announced its remedy for 
pervasive structural ineffectiveness, it began to address cases involving 
ineffectiveness that was structural but episodic. 
For example, in Gilbert v. California, the defendant was charged with, among 
other things, a series of robberies.64 At trial, the government offered testimony 
indicating that eleven eyewitnesses had identified the defendant as the robber 
at a postindictment, pretrial lineup that police had staged without defense 
counsel present.65 Gilbert was decided along with a companion case, United 
States v. Wade.66 In these cases, the Court first noted that corporeal pretrial 
identification procedures are “peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and 
variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair 
trial.”67 The eyewitnesses are often subjected to suggestive influences that are 
difficult to re-create and challenge at trial later on. Additionally, once a witness 
picks a suspect out of a lineup, she is unlikely to change her mind, and witness 
 
 63. See, e.g., Mayeux, supra note 41, at 17-19 (explaining how some judges and legislators 
around the country were hostile to the right to appointed counsel); see also id. at 62-63 
(describing how hostile trial judges tried to avoid the implications of Gideon, believing 
that “petty stuff  should be . . . handled by the judge in his own way” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting William P. Homans, Jr., Board 
Member, Massachusetts Defenders Committee)). 
 64. 388 U.S. 263, 265 (1967).  
 65. Id. at 269-70; see also Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1966) (discussing 
the testimony of these eleven eyewitnesses). Police had put over one hundred 
eyewitnesses to these various robberies into an auditorium together and asked them en 
masse to identify the perpetrator from a lineup. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 269-70, 270 n.2. 
 66. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 67. Id. at 228. 
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identification testimony tends to be highly persuasive to juries.68 For these 
reasons, the Court deemed pretrial lineups “critical stages” in criminal 
prosecutions where counsel’s presence is “necessary to preserve the defendant’s 
basic right to a fair trial.”69 Because Gilbert did not have counsel at the pretrial 
lineup, the Supreme Court held that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had 
been violated.70 In other cases, the Court deemed other elements of criminal 
proceedings “critical stages” subject to the same analysis. Examples include 
pretrial police interrogations71 and a defendant’s pretrial decision to submit to 
a psychiatric examination.72 
Of course, the trial itself is also a critical stage of the prosecution, and the 
episodic denial of the right to counsel within it is treated comparably. In  
Geders v. United States, for example, the trial court ordered the defense attorney 
not to consult with his client for a period of seventeen hours during an 
overnight recess that was taken while the defendant was testifying at trial.73 
Recognizing that the trial itself is a critical stage of the prosecution, the Court 
found a violation of the Sixth Amendment.74 
The fact that the Sixth Amendment is violated, however, does not always 
mean that a conviction is reversed and a new trial ordered. Where the denial of 
counsel is structural and pervasive, that result follows automatically (as noted 
above) without any need for a specific demonstration of prejudice. But the 
Court’s treatment of cases involving episodic structural denials of the right to 
counsel is similar only up to a point. As in cases where the denial is pervasive, 
the defendant in an episodic-denial case is entitled to a presumption of 
prejudice. But that presumption goes only to the specific episode in which 
counsel was denied, rather than applying pervasively to the entire proceeding. 
Thus, if a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has 
attached,75 and so long as that right has not been waived, denying the 
defendant access to counsel at a critical stage constitutes a Sixth Amendment 
 
 68. Id. at 228-32. 
 69. Id. at 227. 
 70. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 271-72. 
 71. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203-04, 206 (1964). 
 72. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71 (1981). The Court deemed arraignment and 
preliminary hearings critical stages that would trigger the need for counsel, see id. at 
469-70, but whether the denial of counsel at those stages results in episodic or pervasive 
structural ineffectiveness is a trickier question, see infra Part III.B. 
 73. 425 U.S. 80, 81-82 (1976). 
 74. Id. at 82-83, 91. 
 75. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (noting that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the moment of the first formal hearing, 
indictment, formal charge, preliminary hearing, information, or arraignment, 
whichever comes first). 
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violation requiring the exclusion of any evidence obtained at that critical stage. 
As the Court noted in Gilbert, the government is at fault in cases like these, and 
“[o]nly a per se exclusionary rule . . . can be an effective sanction to assure that 
law enforcement authorities will respect the accused’s constitutional right to 
the presence of . . . counsel.”76 The defendant has no obligation to show that the 
denial of counsel was prejudicial with respect to what happened at that stage; 
prejudice is conclusively presumed and the Sixth Amendment violation 
deemed complete.77 But instead of presuming that the entire proceeding was 
tainted by prejudice, as in the case of a pervasive structural denial,78 the 
appellate courts subject the episodic deprivation of counsel at a critical stage to 
harmless error review under Chapman v. California.79 In other words, a denial 
of counsel that is structural and episodic is always a Sixth Amendment 
violation, but a reviewing court will not reverse the conviction and order a 
new trial without giving the prosecution the opportunity to demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation of counsel at the critical stage 
was harmless to the ultimate outcome.80 For example, if the defendant was 
deprived of counsel at a pretrial interrogation but the government can show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the resulting statement did not contribute to 
the conviction, reversal will not be warranted.81 Similarly, if a defendant 
facing a capital sentencing hearing is not given access to counsel before 
deciding to undergo a pretrial psychiatric examination on the issue of his 
future dangerousness, the reviewing court will not reverse if the State can 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the psychiatrist’s testimony about the 
evaluation was harmless.82 
 
 76. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967). 
 77. See, e.g., Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-71 (denial of counsel before deciding whether to submit 
to a pretrial psychiatric interview); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) (denial of 
counsel at a postindictment, pretrial corporeal identification procedure); Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (plurality opinion) (denial of counsel at a preliminary 
hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (denial of counsel at a 
postindictment, pretrial corporeal identification procedure); White v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 59, 59-60 (1963) (per curiam) (denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing). 
 78. See sources cited supra note 44. 
 79. 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967). 
 80. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1988) (holding that an Estelle 
violation is subject to the Chapman harmless error test); Moore, 434 U.S. at 227-32 
(holding that a Wade violation is subject to the Chapman harmless error test); Milton v. 
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372, 377-78 (1972) (holding that a Massiah violation is subject 
to the Chapman harmless error test); Coleman, 399 U.S. at 10-11 (holding that a violation 
of the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing in Alabama is subject to the Chapman 
harmless error test). 
 81. See Milton, 407 U.S. at 372. 
 82. See Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 254-58. There are, of course, always questions about the line 
between the episodic and pervasive forms of structural ineffectiveness. See infra Part III.B 
footnote continued on next page 
Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine 
72 STAN. L. REV. 1581 (2020) 
1599 
C. The Coming of Personal Ineffectiveness 
The Supreme Court addressed personal ineffectiveness in McMann v. 
Richardson, a 1970 case involving a criminal defendant who pleaded guilty and 
then wanted to attack the plea as constitutionally defective.83 According to the 
defendant, his trial attorney met with him for only ten minutes before he 
pleaded guilty, incorrectly advised him that they could not challenge the 
voluntariness of his confession until postconviction proceedings, and told him 
to plead guilty to avoid the electric chair.84 There was no allegation of an 
external, structural ineffectiveness problem in McMann; the defendant was 
arguing that fault lay with his attorney personally, not the system.85 The 
Supreme Court in McMann acknowledged that personal, or internal, 
ineffectiveness can violate the Sixth Amendment, but it remanded the case to 
the lower courts without saying much about the legal test for personal 
ineffectiveness or the appropriate next steps if personal ineffectiveness was 
found.86 
Some clarification came ten years later in Cuyler v. Sullivan.87 Cuyler 
involved a potential conflict of interest: Two lawyers jointly represented three 
codefendants in a murder trial.88 But unlike in Holloway,89 the trial court had 
not directed defense counsel to undertake that joint representation. The 
lawyers were privately retained.90 If defense counsel were compromised by a 
conflict of interest, it was because they had made a poor choice. In other words, 
the ineffectiveness at issue was personal, not structural. But although the cases 
differed in that respect, they were comparable in another: As in Holloway, the 
Court recognized that ineffectiveness arising from a conflict of interest 
pervades an entire proceeding.91 If defense counsel labored under an actual 
conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance, the Court 
wrote, that deficiency would infect the entire trial in ways that could not be 
 
(discussing how the denial of counsel at arraignments and preliminary hearings may be 
pervasive or episodic depending on the state’s procedural rules). 
 83. 397 U.S. 759, 760 (1970). 
 84. Id. at 762-63. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 770-71, 774-75 (acknowledging that trial attorney ineffectiveness can give rise to a 
later constitutional challenge if unreasonable attorney incompetence induced a plea 
and noting that defendants “are entitled to the effective assistance of competent 
counsel”). 
 87. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
 88. Id. at 337. 
 89. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 476-77 (1978). 
 90. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 337. 
 91. Id. at 349-50. 
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measured, and the Court would not “indulge in nice calculations as to the 
amount of prejudice” attributable to the conflict.92 In a case of pervasive 
personal ineffectiveness, prejudice would be presumed, and reversal would be 
automatic.93 
But what if a personal ineffectiveness claim was predicated on counsel’s 
individual, episodic errors at trial or during a plea-negotiation process rather 
than on a conflict of interest? When would counsel’s performance be deficient 
enough to be deemed unreasonable? And how much prejudice would a 
defendant have to show in order to obtain postconviction relief? The Supreme 
Court did not answer these questions until 1984. 
D. Strickland and Cronic Solidify the Existence of Four Forms of 
Ineffectiveness 
At this point in the development of Sixth Amendment doctrine, the Court 
had addressed cases where the problem of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
(1) structural and pervasive, (2) structural and episodic, or (3) personal and 
pervasive. What of the fourth possibility—ineffective assistance that was 
personal and episodic? For example, what if defense counsel performed 
ineffectively not by litigating while burdened by a conflict of interest but by 
failing to call a witness or failing to object to a piece of evidence? The Court 
finally addressed that scenario in 1984, when it decided Strickland v. Washington.94 
On the same day, the Court also decided United States v. Cronic.95 And though 
the Court did not explain the decisions in these terms, Strickland and  
Cronic together mapped and distinguished the four forms of trial attorney 
ineffectiveness. 
 
 92. Id. at 348-50 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942), superseded in other 
part by rule, Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)). 
 93. The Court did note that, in order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, the 
defendant first needed to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest that affected trial 
counsel’s representation. Id. at 348. The mere possibility of a conflict was not sufficient. 
After all, sometimes multiple representation of defendants by an attorney can be 
advantageous to the defendants, and sometimes defendants are willing to waive any 
conflict. But once the defendant demonstrated that counsel was laboring under an 
actual conflict of interest that affected counsel’s choices and actions, prejudice would be 
presumed. For example, if the record showed that defense counsel failed to cross-
examine a prosecution witness due to fear about implicating one of the codefendants 
even though the testimony might have been favorable to another codefendant, then 
there was an actual conflict. Id. at 348-49 (discussing Glasser). Or if counsel failed to 
object to arguably inadmissible evidence because it would help one defendant even if it 
might hurt another, that would demonstrate a conflict. Id. at 349 (discussing Glasser). 
 94. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The issue had been percolating in the lower courts for years. See 
Bazelon, supra note 1, at 28-38 (summarizing the lower courts’ approaches). 
 95. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
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Strickland and Cronic involved allegations of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel at opposite corners of my two-by-two matrix. In Strickland, after the 
defendant was convicted of kidnapping and murder and sentenced to death, he 
alleged that his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective at the sentencing 
phase of his trial, citing six specific errors that he thought trial counsel made.96 
So the case presented the Supreme Court with an allegation of episodic 
personal ineffectiveness. In contrast, the allegation in Cronic was one of 
pervasive structural ineffectiveness. The trial court in Cronic appointed a 
young lawyer with a real estate practice to represent a defendant indicted on 
mail fraud charges and gave the lawyer twenty-five days to prepare.97 (The 
lawyer had asked for at least thirty.98) After he was convicted at trial, Cronic 
argued that, in light of the complexity of the charges, giving his trial attorney 
only twenty-five days to prepare necessarily prevented him from having 
effective assistance of counsel.99 
The Supreme Court rejected both claims in opinions that implicitly 
surveyed the four forms of ineffectiveness. First, the Strickland Court noted the 
possibility of pervasive structural ineffectiveness by writing that “[a]ctual or 
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether [violates the Sixth 
Amendment and] is legally presumed to result in prejudice.”100 The Court’s 
concern with structural rather than merely personal ineffectiveness in this 
respect was particularly clear in Cronic. Citing Powell v. Alabama,101 the Cronic 
Court noted the possibility of “occasions when although counsel is available to 
assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully 
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption 
of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the 
trial.”102 The idea that something about the circumstances of a trial could 
prevent even a fully competent attorney from being able to provide effective 
 
 96. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672, 675. The allegations were that counsel had “failed to move 
for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to 
investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, 
to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the 
medical examiner’s reports or cross-examine the medical experts.” Id. at 675. 
 97. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649, 663. 
 98. Id. at 663. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; accord Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25 (“The Court has uniformly 
found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was . . . 
totally absent . . . .”). The Court also recognized that pervasive structural ineffectiveness 
could be constructive as well as actual. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (“That a person who 
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to 
satisfy the constitutional command.”). 
 101. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 102. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 (emphasis added). 
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assistance makes clear that the Court was discussing structural as opposed to 
personal ineffectiveness. 
In Strickland and Cronic, the Court recognized that structural 
ineffectiveness can be episodic as well as pervasive,103 noting that prejudice is 
presumed in both scenarios for the same reasons104 (albeit relative only to the 
specified episodes in one and to the entire proceeding in the other105). First, 
“[p]rejudice . . . is so likely that case-by-case inquiry . . . is not worth the cost.”106 
Second, the total deprivation of counsel at trial or at a critical stage is “easy to 
identify” and thus easy to prevent going forward.107 And third, the government 
is “directly responsible” for structural problems, so it can take steps to prevent 
them.108 
With respect to personal ineffectiveness claims, the Court recognized both 
the episodic and pervasive forms of personal ineffectiveness and promulgated a 
test for personal ineffectiveness challenges going forward. First, the defendant 
would have to show that the trial attorney’s performance was deficient, 
meaning that counsel performed unreasonably given prevailing norms of 
practice.109 For example, the Court noted that Cuyler v. Sullivan involved a 
claim of deficient performance because the defendant alleged that the defense 
attorney had breached the duty of loyalty to the client and “fail[ed] to render 
 
 103. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (“Government violates the right to effective assistance 
when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent 
decisions about how to conduct the defense.” (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 
(1976) (judge bars attorney from speaking with client during an overnight recess); 
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (judge bars defense’s closing argument in a 
bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (judge requires that defendant be 
first witness to testify); and Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (judge prevents 
direct examination of defendant))). 
 104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25. 
 105. That is, Chapman’s harmless error inquiry applies to episodic structural ineffectiveness 
claims, but pervasive structural ineffectiveness claims are subject to automatic reversal 
on appeal. See supra Parts I.A-.B. 
 106. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. Of course, episodic structural ineffectiveness claims are still subject to Chapman 
harmless error review on appeal. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 109. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91. The deficient performance prong of the Strickland test 
followed naturally from the Court’s decision in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 
(1970). As the Court put it, it had already “indirectly” recognized the standard of 
“reasonably effective assistance” in McMann when it said “that a guilty plea cannot be 
attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not ‘a reasonably 
competent attorney’ and the advice was not ‘within the range of competence demanded 
of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 
770-71). 
Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine 
72 STAN. L. REV. 1581 (2020) 
1603 
‘adequate legal assistance’” due to a conflict of interest.110 To establish deficient 
performance in that context, the defendant had to demonstrate that there was 
an actual conflict of interest that affected defense counsel’s representation.111 
But deficient performance could exist outside of conflict-of-interest cases 
when a trial attorney makes errors at trial or during a plea negotiation process 
if those errors demonstrate that counsel performed unreasonably given 
prevailing norms of practice. While recognizing that unreasonable errors by 
counsel could give rise to constitutional violations, the Court was concerned 
about hamstringing defense counsel by limiting their freedom to make 
strategic choices and deterring attorneys from becoming defense counsel for 
fear of being harshly “grade[d]” by reviewing courts.112 For these reasons, it 
announced that there would be no checklist for attorney performance.113 
Rather, defense counsel would be “strongly presumed” to have made strategic 
choices, and defendants would have the burden of overcoming that 
presumption.114 
Strickland and Cronic also made clear that the test for personal 
ineffectiveness would depend on whether the deficient performance alleged 
was pervasive or episodic. For pervasive personal ineffectiveness, once 
deficient performance is shown, prejudice will be presumed just as it is for 
pervasive structural ineffectiveness.115 The prejudice issue, the Court wrote, is 
about the effect of counsel’s pervasive failure on the fairness of the trial, not 
about who is culpable for that failure.116 So if ineffectiveness is pervasive, it 
infects the entire proceeding, and defendants should not be asked to 
demonstrate specific prejudice.117 
 
 110. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)); see also 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984). 
 111. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348-50. 
 112. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91, 697. 
 113. Id. at 688-89. 
 114. Id. at 690. 
 115. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
 116. Id. at 662 & n.31. In so noting, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s attempt to 
distinguish between pervasive structural claims and pervasive personal claims. The 
government had argued that a presumption of prejudice should apply only when trial 
counsel is subject to “external constraints” on her performance. Id. at 662 n.31. The 
Court disagreed, noting that the presumption of prejudice applies to pervasive claims 
even if the problem is “entirely self-imposed,” because of the breadth of the violation. 
Id. 
 117. See id. at 659 (“[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful 
adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes 
the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable. No specific showing of prejudice 
[is] required . . . .”). 
Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine 
72 STAN. L. REV. 1581 (2020) 
1604 
But when personal ineffectiveness is episodic, prejudice will not be 
presumed—not even with respect to the specific episode in which counsel 
performed ineffectively.118 In this respect, personal ineffectiveness is treated 
differently from structural ineffectiveness where prejudice is presumed for 
purposes of establishing a Sixth Amendment violation, even for episodic 
errors. There are two reasons why. First, “[t]he government is not responsible 
for, and hence not able to prevent, [personal] attorney errors.”119 Defendants 
would accordingly bear the burden of demonstrating prejudicial effect. Second, 
the likelihood of prejudice is greater when ineffectiveness is structural and 
episodic than when it is personal and episodic.120 In the former scenario, the 
government has deprived the defendant of counsel at a critical stage or 
interfered with counsel’s ability to do her job, and a defendant who must 
operate without the assistance of counsel (even only episodically) is, in that 
episode, utterly exposed to the hazards of a complex system and a sophisticated 
prosecutorial apparatus. In that posture, “[p]rejudice . . . is so likely that case-by-
case inquiry . . . is not worth the cost.”121 But when episodic ineffectiveness is 
personal rather than structural, the defendant is often not similarly exposed, 
even though the attorney who is supposed to protect him is performing 
inadequately. As a result, episodic personal attorney errors come in a variety of 
different forms ranging from extremely prejudicial to utterly harmless.122 For 
these reasons, the Court concluded that a defendant alleging episodic personal 
ineffectiveness would have to demonstrate prejudice. In particular, they would 
have to show that their trial attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced their 
defense by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”123 
 
 118. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (“Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness 
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general 
requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice.”). 
 119. Id. The Court noted that structural ineffectiveness is easier for a court to detect since 
the government or the system itself is imposing restrictions on defense counsel, and it 
is easier for the government to refrain from imposing structural limits on trial 
counsel’s performance than it is to find and prevent all forms of personal 
ineffectiveness. See id. at 692. 
 120. See id. at 692. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 693. 
 123. Id. at 694; see also id. (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”). This standard is not as demanding, the Court noted, as a 
standard requiring a defendant to show “that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely 
than not altered the outcome in the case.” Id. at 693. But it is more demanding than a 
requirement that the defendant merely demonstrate that attorney errors “impaired the 
presentation of the defense.” Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent at 58, Strickland, 466 U.S. 
668 (No. 82-1554), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 533). 
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In sum, the Court had recognized and distinguished among the four forms 
of ineffectiveness once Strickland and Cronic were decided. And the Court had 
articulated the doctrinal tests applicable in each scenario. Notably, only one 
form—episodic personal ineffectiveness—requires defendants to make specific 
showings of prejudice in order to establish Sixth Amendment violations. 
II. Personal-Episodic Myopia 
Since the Supreme Court articulated its two-pronged test for assessing 
claims of episodic personal attorney ineffectiveness in Strickland, it has paid 
little attention to structural ineffectiveness. In fact, the Supreme Court has not 
reached the merits of a structural ineffectiveness challenge in the last thirty 
years.124 Instead, almost all of the Court’s jurisprudence on issues of the 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel has addressed episodic personal 
ineffectiveness. 
There are several potential reasons why the Court focused on personal 
ineffectiveness after Strickland. First, the Strickland test was new. Litigants and 
lower courts accordingly made many arguments about the test’s two prongs—
deficient performance and prejudice—each of which initially seemed to be a 
fairly open-ended standard.125 By contrast, the tests for the structural forms of 
ineffectiveness were well established. Moreover, complete denials of counsel at 
trial were rare by the 1980s—or, more precisely, they were rare in cases involving 
defendants who might plausibly file postconviction challenges to their trial 
attorneys’ performance.126 Many assumed that the judiciary had little appetite 
for claims of constructive structural ineffectiveness: Powell v. Alabama remains 
 
 124. The last case was Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989), which rejected a claim. More 
recently, Woods v. Donald raised an episodic structural ineffectiveness challenge 
predicated on a trial court’s decision to conduct ten minutes of the trial proceedings 
without defense counsel present, but the Court disposed of the case under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2254(d) without addressing the merits of the underlying claim. 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1375-78 
(2015) (per curiam). 
 125. See Berger, supra note 11, at 104-12 (discussing the hard questions left open for litigants 
to resolve after Strickland); Grace Chung & Alan Sege, Twenty-Second Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-1992—Trial; 
Right to Counsel, 81 GEO. L.J. 1267, 1281-90 (1993) (summarizing the arguments and 
decisions in courts interpreting the Strickland standard). 
 126. Most defendants have no incentive (or even ability) to file postconviction challenges to 
their trial attorneys’ performance because it takes years to get to postconviction 
review, and the defendants are released from custody before postconviction review 
becomes possible. See Primus, supra note 7, at 680-81. As a result, although alleged 
misdemeanants are often denied counsel, they typically don’t challenge the Sixth 
Amendment violation. See Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal 
Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648, 1683-86, 1694 (2019) (reviewing ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, 
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING (2018)) (noting that “motions and appeals are rarely filed”). 
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the only case in which the Supreme Court has credited such a claim, and many 
lower courts thought that the Court’s unwillingness to find a Sixth Amendment 
violation in Cronic made it clear that constructive structural claims would be 
difficult to win.127 As for episodic forms of structural ineffectiveness, which 
commonly occurred in pretrial proceedings, they were generally addressed 
through exclusion of the resulting evidence at trial or with Chapman analysis 
of improperly admitted evidence later on.128 Twenty years after Strickland and 
Cronic, the Court revealed much about conventional thinking by describing 
Cronic as creating a “narrow exception” to the otherwise-dominant Strickland 
regime for assessing attorney effectiveness.129 
Claims of pervasive personal ineffectiveness also receded. A few litigants 
tried to get the Supreme Court to say more about that scenario, but their 
attempts were rebuffed when the Court either recast their claims as alleging 
episodic ineffectiveness130 or used the deferential standards of federal habeas 
corpus review to avoid addressing the claims on their merits.131 In all, of the 
forty ineffective assistance of counsel cases that the Supreme Court has 
addressed since Strickland and Cronic, thirty-one have focused on episodic 
personal ineffectiveness.132 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s focus on 
Strickland ’s domain has led lower courts and scholars to focus on it as well. A 
Westlaw search reveals that for every judicial citation to Cronic, there are 
approximately twenty citations to Strickland.133 The scholarly consideration of 
 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1144 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (describing 
Cronic as creating an exception to Strickland and noting that “the exception applie[s] ‘to 
only a very narrow spectrum of cases’” and that the “burden of establishing that an 
error warrants Cronic’s presumption of prejudice is a ‘very heavy one’” (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1153 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc))); see 
also Lorelei Laird, The Gideon Revolution, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2017, at 44, 46 (noting that 
David Carroll, the Executive Director of the Sixth Amendment Center, believes that 
Cronic “might not have been on attorneys’ radars because the criminal defendant in 
Cronic lost his ineffective assistance claim”); Carol S. Steiker, Keynote Address, Gideon 
at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2701 (2013) (describing Cronic as 
“shut[ting] off systemic arguments by individual defendants seeking to overturn their 
convictions”). 
 128. See supra Part I.B. 
 129. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004). 
 130. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98 (2002). 
 131. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-26 (2008) (per curiam) (avoiding a pervasive 
personal ineffectiveness challenge by noting that the law was not clearly established 
and therefore did not satisfy federal habeas requirements). 
 132. See infra Appendix (categorizing Supreme Court cases). 
 133. According to a Westlaw search conducted on January 20, 2020, there have been 187,104 
citations to Strickland in the courts and only 8,985 citations to Cronic. 
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Strickland far outpaces consideration of Cronic as well.134 Many scholars 
criticize the Strickland standard, talking about the injustices that result from its 
application and proposing alternatives.135 Cronic is often ignored, and when it 
is mentioned, scholars typically note its limited effect and emphasize that it is a 
small exception to the generally applicable Strickland regime.136 
This focus on episodic personal ineffectiveness is problematic. It threatens 
to underenforce the right to effective trial counsel on the whole because data 
from the last three decades suggest that many of the problems in criminal 
defense representation in this country are structural, not personal.137 To 
attempt to solve those problems with a tool designed for redressing episodic 
instances of personal ineffectiveness would be, at best, to play whack-a-mole 
with the Sixth Amendment. And if anything, that image understates the futility 
of approaching the project this way, because structural problems are not 
properly understood as the sum of many instances of personal ineffectiveness. 
Some litigants have tried to raise structural ineffectiveness challenges and 
have been stymied by lower courts whose tendency to regard Strickland as the 
sole framework for ineffectiveness claims has led them to incorporate aspects 
of Strickland ’s analysis where they do not belong. For example, there are cases 
involving allegations of structural ineffectiveness where courts have deployed 
Strickland ’s presumption that lawyers are competent and are engaged in 
tactical decisionmaking.138 That presumption is entirely inapposite in structural 
 
 134. According to a Westlaw search conducted on January 20, 2020, there have been 5,365 
citations to Strickland in secondary sources and only 1,203 citations to Cronic. 
 135. See, e.g., supra note 11 (criticizing the Strickland standard); see also, e.g., Calhoun, supra 
note 1, at 416-17 (proposing an alternative); Jahaan Shaheed, Note, The “Amorphous 
Reasonable Attorney” Standard: A Checklist Approach to Ineffective Counsel in Juvenile Court, 
24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 914-18 (2011) (same). 
 136. See sources cited supra note 127; see also, e.g., Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s 
Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 363, 380 (2003) (describing “the Cronic exception” as “illusory”); Amanda 
Myra Hornung, Note, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration of 
the Right to Appointment of Legal Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y 
& ETHICS J. 495, 513 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Cronic 
“exception” narrowly). In light of some lower courts’ willingness to recognize Cronic 
violations in civil cases challenging systemic indigent defense delivery failures, there 
has been some recent discussion of Cronic in the literature, see, e.g., sources cited infra 
notes 196, 203, but it is still dwarfed by the discussion of Strickland. 
 137. See sources cited supra notes 2-3. 
 138. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 780 S.E.2d 835, 839, 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). Warren is one 
example of a case where a state court improperly applied Strickland to a structural 
claim. There are others. See e.g., Robinson v. State, 791 S.E.2d 13, 15-16 (Ga. 2016) 
(applying Strickland incorrectly to an allegation of structural ineffectiveness predicated 
on the system’s failure to appoint the defendant counsel until a year after his arrest and 
counsel’s consequent inability to find defense witnesses); People v. Fuller, No. 255961, 
2005 WL 3076931, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2005) (per curiam) (applying 
footnote continued on next page 
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ineffectiveness challenges. If the allegation is that the structure of an indigent 
defense delivery system prevents attorneys from having the time or 
information needed to make tactical decisions, courts should not presume that 
the decisions those attorneys made were tactical. As the Court noted in Cronic, 
there are cases where even fully competent attorneys cannot possibly deliver 
constitutionally adequate representation.139 
Consider, for example, State v. Warren.140 Defense counsel had requested a 
writ to have two defense witnesses transported from a detention facility to 
testify at trial.141 When the State failed to transport the prisoners, counsel 
asked for a continuance, which the trial court denied.142 On appeal, the 
defendant alleged that the trial court’s failure to grant the continuance 
interfered with his trial attorney’s ability to provide effective representation.143 
Even though the claim raised was a structural ineffectiveness challenge 
predicated on trial court action, the North Carolina Court of Appeals analyzed 
the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim under Strickland, noting that “we are 
unable to determine whether defense counsel’s failure to call [the witnesses] to 
testify constituted trial strategy.”144 Nothing in the record suggested a trial 
strategy not to call these witnesses. Counsel requested their presence, applied 
for and received writs to obtain their presence, and objected when they were 
not produced by the State.145 This was a structural ineffectiveness challenge 
not susceptible to Strickland ’s analytical structure—but, by habit or otherwise, 
the court applied Strickland anyway. 
The improper conflation of the tests for personal and structural 
ineffectiveness has also infected civil lawsuits aimed at redressing structural 
violations of the Sixth Amendment. Consider Platt v. State, an Indiana case in 
which a group of criminal defendants filed a pretrial civil action arguing that 
“the system for providing legal counsel for indigents in Marion County lacks 
sufficient funds for pretrial investigation and preparation which inherently 
causes ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.”146 That allegation clearly 
claimed structural ineffectiveness. But the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected 
the plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claims because the plaintiffs did not 
 
Strickland incorrectly where the defendant alleged that ineffectiveness resulted from 
his trial attorney’s appointment to represent him on the day of trial). 
 139. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984). 
 140. 780 S.E.2d 835. 
 141. Id. at 839. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 843. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 839-40. 
 146. 664 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
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demonstrate specific prejudice as described in Strickland.147 The requirement to 
demonstrate prejudice under Strickland is, of course, a requirement tailored for 
claims of episodic personal ineffectiveness; it is entirely inapposite in cases 
alleging pervasive structural violations. Indeed, its transposition to the 
pervasive structural context is particularly troubling given that Supreme 
Court doctrine specifically establishes that prejudice should be presumed upon 
a finding of pervasive structural ineffectiveness.148 But in Platt, as in Warren, 
Strickland ’s analysis infected a domain where it did not belong and doomed a 
Sixth Amendment claim. 
Focusing on episodic personal ineffectiveness is also problematic because 
many trial judges are particularly reluctant to recognize that kind of 
ineffectiveness, even when it does exist. Because Strickland ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims typically require extrarecord development in 
the trial court about what counsel did and did not do and about her defense 
strategies,149 trial court judges (often the same trial judges who presided over 
the initial trials) will hold hearings to develop the record and will make the 
initial determinations about whether trial attorneys were ineffective under 
Strickland. Many trial judges don’t like saying that a particular lawyer who is a 
part of their local legal community was inadequate on the basis of one (or even 
a few) mistake(s).150 Judges know and regularly interact with these defense 
attorneys and are often loath to personally criticize their professionalism in 
such a deep way.151 The trial attorneys who are asked to admit their own 
failures are also frequently reluctant to do so both because of the psychological 
discomfort that comes with admitting error152 and out of fear that there will 
be professional repercussions stemming from their admissions.153 
 
 147. Id. at 362-63 (noting that “a violation of a Sixth Amendment right will arise only after a 
defendant has shown he was prejudiced by an unfair trial”). 
 148. As discussed in Part III below, not all lower courts have improperly conflated personal 
and structural ineffectiveness challenges. That said, the conflation is not an isolated 
problem and is indicative of the general confusion in some lower courts about the 
different forms of constitutional ineffectiveness. 
 149. See Primus, supra note 7, at 689. 
 150. See Bazelon, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that judges are “reluctan[t] to soil the 
reputations of appointed counsel by labeling their work ‘ineffective’”). 
 151. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal 
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 825-26 
(explaining how “appointed lawyers also stay in the good graces of the judges by 
contributing to their campaigns for office”). 
 152. See generally CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY 
ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS (rev. ed. 
2015) (describing cognitive dissonance); Kristin Wong, Why It’s So Hard to Admit You’re 
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/NJ89-LLC9 (summarizing studies). 
 153. See, e.g., Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the 
Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1201 n.180 (1988) (“Lawyer concern and fear 
footnote continued on next page 
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Trial attorneys are more willing to cooperate when the allegation is one of 
structural ineffectiveness. If an indigent defense delivery system is structured 
such that even a fully competent attorney is incapable of providing effective 
assistance,154 the attorney who makes mistakes is not at fault. The system is 
ineffective, and the trial attorney is one of the victims of that poorly structured 
system. And while trial judges may be reluctant to indict structural aspects of 
the criminal justice system,155 presenting data about structural problems in 
trial courts preserves the record for states’ higher courts, which may be more 
receptive to structural claims.156 
Of course, it is also possible that some courts are intentionally focusing on 
episodic personal ineffectiveness. In a world where we are suffering from an 
indigent defense crisis,157 focusing on structural errors that are often systemic 
runs the risk of essentially declaring that the whole system is 
unconstitutional.158 Courts might not want to spend the political capital 
required to upend the entire system by dismissing massive numbers of criminal 
cases or ordering states to redirect large sums of money to fund indigent 
defense. These courts may try to avoid structural ineffectiveness challenges by 
treating systemic crises like a smattering of discrete, episodic personal problems. 
Litigants who fail to raise structural ineffectiveness claims clearly and who cite 
Strickland rather than Cronic enable such judicial avoidance.159 
 
of a malpractice claim most certainly exists.”). Every state has procedures to discipline 
ineffective and unethical attorneys. See id. at 1174-75. 
 154. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984). 
 155. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6-22 (1997) (describing how courts are loath to inject 
themselves into questions of indigent defense funding and structure). 
 156. See, e.g., State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 338-39 (La. 2005) (noting that trial judges have 
the power to halt criminal prosecutions until adequate defense funding is made 
available); Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, 718 (Pa. 2016) (recognizing a civil 
cause of action entitling a “class of indigent criminal defendants to allege prospective, 
systemic violations of the right to counsel due to underfunding”); see also, e.g., Hurrell-
Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 224-25 (N.Y. 2010). 
 157. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837, 1841-66 (1994) (describing “the 
pervasiveness of deficient representation”); see also sources cited supra note 3 (describing 
the indigent defense crisis). 
 158. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicting 
the Supreme Court majority for stating that recognizing a constitutional problem with 
the racially disparate effects of the imposition of the death penalty “would open the 
door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing” and suggesting that 
their view demonstrated “a fear of too much justice”). 
 159. See, e.g., Fusi v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2010) (dismissing a structural 
ineffectiveness claim as unexhausted because the postconviction attorney raised a 
Strickland claim and not a Cronic claim); People v. Jones, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 752, 760-
65 (Ct. App. 2010) (presenting a Strickland challenge in a structural ineffectiveness case 
footnote continued on next page 
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A myopic focus on Strickland also has problematic downstream 
consequences related to the timing of ineffectiveness challenges. Strickland 
claims are typically raised after trial at the appellate or postconviction stages 
because we do not expect trial attorneys to raise their own personal 
ineffectiveness.160 Structural ineffectiveness claims, on the other hand, are ripe 
for pretrial consideration. A focus on episodic personal ineffectiveness means 
that many litigants will not raise pervasive structural ineffectiveness claims 
pretrial.161 When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised after trial, 
the procedural and substantive obstacles to obtaining relief are often 
insurmountable. In most jurisdictions, defendants who want to challenge their 
trial attorney’s ineffectiveness after trial must wait until state postconviction 
proceedings to do so because they need to expand the record to support the 
claim.162 There is currently no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel 
at the postconviction stage, so the vast majority of defendants must reinvestigate 
their own cases and figure out how to raise ineffectiveness challenges from 
within their prison cells.163 It often takes years for litigants to get to the 
postconviction stage after the direct appeal process, which means that only 
convicted felons with long prison sentences have realistic opportunities to 
challenge their trial attorneys’ performance after trial.164 
 
where the defense attorney could not get an investigator to visit the scene due to a 
shortage of investigative resources). 
 160. In fact, an attorney who raises her own personal ineffectiveness puts herself into a 
conflict situation that might require her to withdraw from further representation. See 
3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 6, § 11.7(e). That said, if a trial attorney is suffering from a 
personal problem that is rendering her ineffective and she is aware of it, she absolutely 
should move to withdraw pretrial. 
 161. Although some public defenders have mounted pretrial challenges to structural 
ineffectiveness, see infra Part III.C, the scope of the nationwide indigent defense crisis 
means that many more challenges should be raised. 
 162. See Primus, supra note 7, at 689. 
 163. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding that there is no 
constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings); see also Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (extending Finley to capital cases); 
Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance of Trial 
Counsel Claims in State and Federal Postconviction Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 6, 
7-8 (noting that “a large majority of defendants who file state postconviction 
challenges to their criminal convictions do so without the assistance of counsel” and 
therefore have to reinvestigate their own cases to raise ineffectiveness claims). 
 164. See Primus, supra note 7, at 693-94. In addition to these procedural barriers, there are 
substantive barriers to posttrial review. For example, harmless error doctrines exist at 
both the appellate and postconviction review stages. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619, 622-23 (1993); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946). See generally Justin Murray, A Contextual 
Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2017) (describing the 
harmless error doctrine and suggesting modifications to it). 
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All of this means that many courts are not forced to see and grapple with 
the serious problems of structural ineffectiveness, because the claims either are 
not being raised or are being raised after trial when the system hides the 
ineffectiveness in a procedural labyrinth. Some civil rights organizations and 
law firms doing pro bono work have stepped into the void, filing pretrial class 
actions to document systemic structural problems in indigent defense delivery 
systems.165 While this is a salutary development, there are many obstacles to 
class action litigation that make such suits difficult.166 And the suits are 
expensive, time-consuming, and slow in effectuating change.167 If there are 
other ways to catalyze change and force courts to recognize structural 
problems, litigants should be pursuing them. But this means that litigants need 
to get away from the focus on Strickland. Defense attorneys should raise clear 
pretrial challenges to structural ineffectiveness problems and think creatively 
about how to craft potential remedies.168 
For all of these reasons, it is time to revive the structural forms of trial 
attorney ineffectiveness. 
 
 165. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 427, 431-32 (2009) (describing how these lawsuits have evolved); 
Stephen F. Hanlon, The Appropriate Legal Standard Required to Prevail in a Systemic 
Challenge to an Indigent Defense System, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 625, 630-40 (2017) (describing 
such lawsuits). 
 166. See Steiker, supra note 127, at 2701-03; see also Eve Brensike Primus, ACS Issue Brief, 
Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense Crisis 4-5 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/543C-VXP3. 
 167. See Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right 
to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1331-34 (2013) (discussing the problems with 
class action civil lawsuits). 
 168. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity 
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (“My thesis holds that the 
Strickland inquiry into counsel’s effectiveness ex post should be supplemented by an ex 
ante inquiry into whether the defense is institutionally equipped to litigate as 
effectively as the prosecution.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927, 932 (2013) (arguing that litigants should rely on social science 
to make more creative pretrial arguments); Peter A. Joy, A Judge’s Duty to Do Justice: 
Ensuring the Accused’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 
155-56 (2017) (arguing that judges should perform pretrial inquiries into counsel’s 
effectiveness under certain situations); see also State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 787 (La. 
1993) (agreeing that addressing ineffective assistance claims before trial furthers the 
interests of judicial economy, protects defendants’ constitutional rights, and preserves 
the integrity of the trial process); Emily Chiang, Indigent Defense Invigorated: A Uniform 
Standard for Adjudicating Pre-Conviction Sixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. 
REV. 443, 450-56 (2010) (arguing that more lawyers should raise pretrial challenges to 
structural obstacles that interfere with their abilities to represent their clients). For a 
more extended discussion of possible creative remedies, see Part III.C below. 
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III. Reviving the Structural Forms of Trial Attorney Ineffectiveness 
To revive structural ineffectiveness claims, litigants need to rely on data to 
document existing structural problems. They need to raise structural claims 
early in the litigation process when such claims are ripe for judicial 
consideration, and they need to encourage courts to craft creative remedies to 
redress structural problems. What remedies are appropriate may ultimately 
depend on whether the structural ineffectiveness is episodic or pervasive and 
when it is raised in the litigation process. 
A. Pervasive Structural Ineffectiveness 
Cronic remains the most recent Supreme Court case to address the contours 
of pervasive structural ineffectiveness challenges.169 But much has changed 
about our knowledge of the structural landscape of indigent defense 
representation in the last thirty-five years. We are now more acutely aware of, 
and can better document, systemic structural problems in the provision of 
defense services around the country. 
Most criminal defendants in this country are too poor to afford attorneys 
and must rely on appointed counsel.170 Studies repeatedly reveal that indigent 
defense delivery systems are woefully underfunded and accordingly staffed by 
defense attorneys who often lack adequate training or supervision and whose 
caseloads are impossible for any attorney to manage effectively.171 In some 
 
 169. The Supreme Court has discussed structural ineffectiveness in only a handful of cases 
since its 1984 decision in Cronic. All were in the late 1980s and did not add much to the 
existing doctrine. In Satterwhite v. Texas, the Court made it clear that the State’s failure 
to provide a defendant with counsel to advise him about whether to submit to a 
pretrial psychiatric examination to determine his future dangerousness at a capital 
sentencing hearing was an episodic form of structural ineffectiveness subject to 
Chapman harmless error review when raised posttrial. 486 U.S. 249, 251, 254-58 (1988). 
In Perry v. Leeke, the Court rejected a claim of structural ineffectiveness predicated on a 
trial judge’s refusal to permit defense counsel to speak to his client during a fifteen-
minute trial recess. 488 U.S. 272, 273-74, 283-85 (1989). And in Penson v. Ohio, the Court 
made it clear that the complete denial of an attorney during the decisional process on 
the first appeal as of right is a pervasive structural ineffectiveness problem that merits 
automatic reversal without the need to determine prejudice. 488 U.S. 75, 77-79, 81, 88-
89 (1988). 
 170. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NCJ 179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2000), https://perma.cc/L784-
W9HF (noting that, between 1992 and 1996, more than 80% of criminal defendants in 
the United States’s most populous counties were indigent); Thomas H. Cohen, Who Is 
Better at Defending Criminals? Does Type of Defense Attorney Matter in Terms of Producing 
Favorable Case Outcomes, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 29, 35 (2014) (“In 2004 and 2006, about 
80% of defendants charged with a felony in the nation’s 75 most populous counties 
reported having public defenders or assigned counsel . . . .”). 
 171. See Primus, supra note 2, at 123-28, 130-37 (collecting studies and statistics). 
Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine 
72 STAN. L. REV. 1581 (2020) 
1614 
jurisdictions, defense attorneys regularly meet clients for the first time in the 
courtroom on the day of trial.172 Many defendants plead guilty to serious 
crimes without their attorneys ever having conducted real investigations.173 
And often, the defense function is not sufficiently independent of the judges, 
such that defense lawyers are poorly equipped to withstand judicial pressure to 
process cases quickly—pressure that sometimes includes judges punishing 
defense attorneys for investigating cases, filing motions, or asserting their 
clients’ rights.174 
Some states have created indigent defense commissions to redress these 
systemic problems,175 and there is now an emerging literature about ways to 
improve indigent defense delivery.176 As a result, there is much more evidence 
documenting constructive structural ineffectiveness problems than existed 
when Cronic was decided. 
This evidence should be deployed in courtrooms to encourage judges to 
craft remedies for defendants whose constitutional rights to effective counsel 
have been violated as a result of structural problems. And nothing in the 
Supreme Court case law need stand in the way of these challenges. After all, the 
Court in Cronic cited Powell v. Alabama with approval, describing it as a case in 
which the designation of counsel was “so close upon the trial as to amount to a 
denial of effective and substantial aid.”177 When defender offices are so 
underfunded and overwhelmed that the attorneys cannot meet with their 
clients pretrial or perform the requisite investigation before advising their 
clients about whether to take a plea deal or go to trial, that too seems like the 
“denial of effective and substantial aid.” 
Some have argued that the pervasive structural problems in indigent-
defense delivery systems should not trigger Cronic violations, citing the Court’s 
refusal to recognize a structural problem in Cronic itself, its unwillingness in 
 
 172. See id. at 128-29. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 126. 
 175. See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.4(f) (describing commissions). 
 176. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Remarks, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2680-84 
(2013) (discussing the need for more funding); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Essay, Searching for 
Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 
YALE L.J. 2316, 2327-28 (2013) (noting that the better equipped the indigent defense 
system is, “the less waste and inefficiency”); David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal 
Public Defense: A Call for Independence, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 337 (2017) (emphasizing 
the need for the defense function to be independent of the judiciary); Steiker, supra 
note 127, at 2705-07 (arguing for more training and oversight); see also Primus, supra 
note 2, at 130-45 (describing best practices and collecting scholarly literature on 
proposed solutions). 
 177. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 660 (1984) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 53 (1932)). 
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the years since to recognize structural ineffectiveness in other cases, and its 
description of the structural exception as “narrow.”178 But this ignores some of 
the lower-court development with respect to the scope of the Cronic structural 
exception and other recent developments in the factual and legal landscape 
that might suggest renewed interest in, and a broader role for, structural 
ineffectiveness arguments. 
Some lower courts have bucked the trend of myopically focusing solely on 
episodic personal ineffectiveness claims. These courts’ recognition of structural 
Cronic violations comes in two forms: postconviction challenges to individual 
convictions and pretrial, prospective civil litigation. For an example of the 
first form, consider Mitchell v. Mason.179 Even though the defendant in that case 
had been incarcerated for seven months and was facing murder charges, his 
appointed defense attorney spent only six minutes speaking to him in the 
bullpen on the day of trial.180 When the defendant complained to the trial 
judge and asked for a continuance and a lawyer who would properly prepare a 
defense, the judge denied the request.181 The Sixth Circuit faulted the Michigan 
state courts for failing to recognize that a defense attorney’s failure to meet 
with a client during the entire pretrial period (with the exception of only a six-
minute period on the day of trial) was a clear violation of Cronic.182 Citing 
Powell v. Alabama for the proposition that the pretrial period between 
arraignment and trial is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution when the 
defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective representation,183 the Sixth 
Circuit noted that Cronic clearly held that the Sixth Amendment is violated and 
prejudice must be presumed when counsel is totally absent during a critical 
stage of the proceedings.184 The Sixth Circuit deemed counsel totally absent in 
Mitchell.185 
In a similar case involving a defendant facing armed robbery charges, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that Cronic applied to a constructive denial of 
counsel during the pretrial investigation period.186 In Urquhart v. State, the 
defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for armed robbery.187 He 
challenged the conviction and noted that in the five months leading up to his 
 
 178. See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004). 
 179. 325 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 180. Id. at 735-36, 741-42. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 741. 
 183. Id. at 743. 
 184. Id. at 741-44. 
 185. Id. at 741-42. 
 186. Urquhart v. State, 203 A.3d 719, 734 (Del. 2019) (en banc). 
 187. Id. at 722. 
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trial, three different public defenders had represented him at preliminary 
hearings.188 A fourth public defender was assigned to represent him at trial, but 
that attorney was unable (because of his caseload and other court appearances) 
to meet with him or show him the State’s evidence against him until the 
morning of trial.189 Mr. Urquhart “expressed frustration and confusion to the 
[state] court” before the trial started, noting that counsel had not met with him 
and that he did not know what was going on, but the trial judge proceeded 
with the trial that day anyway.190 The Delaware Supreme Court determined 
that Cronic applied because Mr. Urquhart was constructively denied counsel 
during the entire pretrial period, which was a critical stage of the litigation.191 
For the nearly four months between arraignment and trial, Mr. Urquhart 
received one nonsubstantive phone call from counsel (explaining that counsel 
was in trial and waiting for discovery) and one letter containing some but not 
all of the discovery in the case.192 As the Delaware Supreme Court put it, “the 
Sixth Amendment demands more than the presence the morning of trial of a 
warm body with a law degree.”193 Given counsel’s failure to meet with his 
client pretrial, “the defendant should not have to point to any specific event of 
prejudice and disprove the State’s contention that trial counsel was able to 
‘wing it’ enough at trial to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.”194 Rather, this is a 
situation in which it is “unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective 
assistance” and prejudice should be presumed.195 
Some lower courts have also expressed a willingness to recognize Cronic 
violations in civil cases challenging systemic indigent defense failures.196 Since 
Cronic and Strickland were decided, over thirty-five such cases have been filed 
 
 188. Id. at 721. 
 189. Id. at 721-22. There was evidence that Mr. Urquhart had spoken with defense counsel 
on the phone twice and that Mr. Urquhart had received letters from counsel. See id. at 
730. 
 190. Id. at 722. 
 191. Id. at 730-32. The Delaware Supreme Court also found that counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally deficient under Strickland. See id. at 732-34. 
 192. Id. at 730. 
 193. Id. at 732. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 (1984)). 
 196. See Johanna Kalb, Gideon Incarcerated: Access to Counsel in Pretrial Detention, 9 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 101, 134 (2018) (noting that Cronic went “relatively unexamined” for 
decades until recent civil lawsuits revived reliance on Cronic to address systemic 
challenges); see also Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal 
Cases: Still a National Crisis?, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1564, 1589-1601 (2018) (noting that 
the Department of Justice interventions arguing that Cronic rather than Strickland 
should apply were critical to the success of these suits). 
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around the country.197 In some of these cases, courts have held that actual or 
constructive denials of counsel during the period between arraignment and 
trial violate Cronic and that, as a result, the plaintiffs have stated cognizable 
claims. 
For example, in Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, a federal district court 
found that two cities in Washington State were regularly and systematically 
violating indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.198 The district court 
noted that, due to their high caseloads, defenders had no ability to investigate 
their cases or meet with their clients before trial.199 It was “little more than a 
‘meet and plead’ system.”200 Relying on Cronic, the district court noted that “if 
there is no opportunity for appointed counsel to confer with the accused to 
prepare a defense,” then there is a Sixth Amendment violation with a per se 
presumption of prejudice.201 
In Hurrell-Harring v. State, New York’s highest court addressed allegations 
that five counties in that state were actually and constructively denying 
indigent defendants counsel at pretrial arraignments and during the critical 
pretrial stage between arraignment and trial.202 The high court agreed that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint stated a justiciable cause of action that, if true, would 
demonstrate a Cronic violation. According to that court, 
[a]ctual representation assumes a certain basic representational relationship. The 
allegations here, however, raise serious questions as to whether any such 
relationship may be really said to have existed between many of the plaintiffs and 
their putative attorneys and cumulatively may be understood to raise the distinct 
possibility that merely nominal attorney-client pairings occur in the subject 
counties with a fair degree of regularity, allegedly because of inadequate funding 
and staffing of indigent defense providers.203 
 
 197. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Public Defense Litigation: An Overview, 51 IND. L. REV. 89, 94-98 
(2018) (collecting and discussing these cases). 
 198. 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
 199. Id. at 1124, 1128. 
 200. Id. at 1124. 
 201. Id. at 1131; see also id. at 1132 (“[P]erfunctory ‘representation’ does not satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment.”). 
 202. 930 N.E.2d 217, 222-25 (N.Y. 2010). 
 203. Id. at 224; see also Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
allegations of systemic delays in the appointment of counsel and a failure to provide 
necessary investigative and expert resources for indigent defense are sufficient to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted); Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 136-37 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that declaratory and injunctive relief may be appropriate 
to remedy pervasive and persistent systemic violations of the right to counsel), vacated 
mem. on other grounds, 780 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2010); Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 
715, 743 (Pa. 2016) (holding that a cause of action exists based on severe underfunding of 
indigent defense); Backus & Marcus, supra note 196, at 1599-1601 (explaining the 
importance in these cases of the courts’ willingness to shift away from Strickland ); 
footnote continued on next page 
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Thus, even though the Supreme Court once said it was unwilling to “fashion a 
per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy appointment 
of counsel,”204 some lower courts recognize a difference between tardy 
appointment and the constructive absence of counsel during the entire critical 
pretrial period. When the structure of a state’s indigent defense funding and 
the resulting caseloads translate into trial counsel being unable to have a 
substantive meeting with the defendant pretrial, that is structural 
ineffectiveness that should lead to a per se presumption of prejudice. 
Much of the development of Cronic in the lower courts (at least in the civil 
class action cases) has been made possible by the incredible amount of data that 
has been collected about the indigent defense crisis since 1984. Indigent defense 
commissions, bar associations, state governmental units, and nonprofit 
organizations regularly commission experts to investigate and document 
structural problems in indigent defense delivery systems and their effects at 
both the national and state levels.205 These reports contain a wealth of 
empirical data that was simply not available when Cronic was decided. The 
Supreme Court has recognized a willingness to evolve and recognize on-the-
ground changes to the factual and legal landscape when entertaining 
ineffective assistance challenges.206 It is time to use the data that have been 
collected to revive structural ineffectiveness challenges in both the 
postconviction and pretrial contexts.207 
There has also been a slight shift in the legal landscape since Cronic was 
decided. In the last five years, the Supreme Court has started to recognize 
 
Laurence A. Benner, When Excessive Public Defender Workloads Violate the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel Without a Showing of Prejudice, 5 ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE 
GROUPS 73, 74-75 (2011) (arguing for such a shift). 
 204. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 
(1983) (“Not every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity to investigate or to 
consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.”). 
 205. The Sixth Amendment Center is a central repository that collects these publications. 
See SIXTH AMEND. CTR., https://perma.cc/5Y9B-2BZK (archived Apr. 25, 2020). 
 206. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (noting that “[t]he landscape of federal 
immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years” and relying on those 
changes to inform the Court’s conclusion that trial counsel has a constitutional duty to 
inform noncitizen clients of the risk of deportation before they plead). 
 207. More work has been done to revive structural ineffectiveness challenges in the pretrial 
context than in the postconviction context. See sources cited supra note 165 (describing 
these lawsuits); see also infra Part III.C. Pretrial civil class actions challenging the 
provision of indigent defense services often face procedural obstacles to review in 
court and take a significant investment of time and resources. See sources cited supra 
notes 166-67. Judicial recognition of structural ineffectiveness problems in individual 
challenges is an underused tool for catalyzing reform. See infra Part III.C; see also Bibas, 
supra note 6, at 7-11 (discussing how the judiciary can use individual postconviction 
cases to catalyze systemic reform when it wants to). 
Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine 
72 STAN. L. REV. 1581 (2020) 
1619 
aspects of the indigent defense crisis in its decisions. First, in Martinez v. Ryan 
and Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court brushed aside an important 
procedural restriction that had been preventing criminal defendants from 
having claims of trial attorney ineffectiveness considered in federal habeas 
corpus petitions.208 The Court explained that states cannot prevent the federal 
courts from addressing substantial claims of trial attorney ineffectiveness by 
burying those claims in state postconviction review and then denying indigent 
defendants access to effective lawyers to help them raise the claims at that 
stage.209 These decisions paved the way for broader consideration of trial 
attorney ineffectiveness claims in federal courts.210 
Second, the Supreme Court recently spoke more directly about the 
indigent defense crisis. In the course of holding that the pretrial restraint of a 
defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets (which the defendant needed to retain 
counsel of choice) violated the Sixth Amendment, the Court noted that, if 
pretrial restraint were permissible, it would mean that the defendant would be 
rendered indigent and would have to rely on a public defender.211 Citing 
statistics about public defenders’ excessive caseloads and limited resources, the 
Supreme Court plurality noted that forcing these defendants to rely on public 
defenders would create a “substantial risk” of “render[ing] less effective the 
basic right the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect.”212 It was clear, as one of the 
dissents in that case noted, that the plurality was suggesting that defendants 
represented by public defenders are more likely to receive inadequate 
representation.213 The Court is clearly aware of and expressing some concerns 
about the structural problems in indigent defense delivery systems. Litigants 
should use this language to persuade lower courts that they should not take 
such a dim view of Cronic claims. 
 
 208. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 416-17 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012). 
The procedural restriction is the procedural default doctrine. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 86-91 (1977) (holding that a state prisoner who waived his constitutional 
claims in state court by failing to comply with state procedural rules for properly 
raising the claims has procedurally defaulted those claims in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings and cannot have the claims considered on the merits unless the state 
prisoner can demonstrate “cause” and “prejudice” to excuse the prior failure, or a 
“miscarriage of justice”). 
 209. Trevino, 569 U.S. at 416-17; Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17. 
 210. For discussions of how litigants can use Martinez and Trevino to open the doors to 
broader habeas review of trial attorney ineffectiveness claims, see Eve Brensike 
Primus, Essay, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of 
State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2611-17 (2013); and Eve Brensike Primus, Federal 
Review of State Criminal Convictions: A Structural Approach to Adequacy Doctrine, 116 
MICH. L. REV. 75, 108-10 (2017). 
 211. See Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087, 1095 (2016) (plurality opinion). 
 212. Id. at 1095. 
 213. Id. at 1110 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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The willingness of some lower courts to entertain pervasive structural 
ineffectiveness challenges, the existence of a treasure trove of data to support 
such challenges, and the Supreme Court’s dicta suggesting that it understands 
there are problems with indigent defense delivery systems should all 
encourage litigants to raise more structural Cronic arguments. And lower 
courts should be receptive to finding structural ineffectiveness in the critical 
period between arraignment and trial. 
B. Episodic Structural Ineffectiveness 
When either pervasive or episodic structural ineffectiveness is found, 
prejudice is presumed and the Sixth Amendment violation is complete. But 
marking the line between episodic and pervasive structural ineffectiveness is 
important because pervasive structural ineffectiveness merits automatic 
reversal whereas episodic structural ineffectiveness is subject to harmless error 
analysis under Chapman when raised posttrial. Thus, it is important to consider 
what guidance the Supreme Court has given about how to draw a dividing line. 
Consider, for example, what should happen when a defendant is denied an 
attorney at a critical pretrial stage like an arraignment. The Supreme Court has 
held that the denial of counsel at other pretrial stages—like lineups, police 
interrogations, and decisions about whether to submit to pretrial psychiatric 
examinations—is episodic and therefore subject to Chapman harmless error 
review.214 But in Hamilton v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the failure 
to provide counsel at the defendant’s arraignment was a pervasive form of 
structural ineffectiveness.215 The Court noted that, during Alabama 
arraignments, “[a]vailable defenses may be . . . irretrievably lost, if not then and 
there asserted.”216 As a result, what happens at the arraignment “may affect the 
whole trial.”217 For that reason, the Court held that it would “not stop to 
determine whether prejudice resulted” because “the degree of prejudice can 
never be known.”218 
As the Supreme Court explained in a later case, when the deprivation of 
the right to counsel at a critical stage “affected—and contaminated—the entire 
criminal proceeding,” then the error is pervasive and requires automatic 
reversal.219 Given the different structure of arraignment hearings in different 
 
 214. See sources cited supra note 80. 
 215. 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961). 
 216. Id. at 54. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 55. 
 219. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257 (1988). This explains why deprivations of 
counsel during the entirety of the period between arraignment and trial are pervasive. 
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state and federal jurisdictions, whether the denial of counsel at an arraignment 
is episodic or pervasive will depend on the jurisdiction.220 The same is true for 
preliminary hearings.221 Thus, reviewing courts must ask whether the denial 
of counsel at a critical stage irrevocably affects and contaminates the later trial 
or plea. For example, if the denial of counsel at the pretrial stage causes a 
defendant to lose the ability to assert a defense entirely, then the later trial is 
inherently and irrevocably contaminated, and there is a pervasive structural 
problem. In contrast, if the denial of counsel at the pretrial stage resulted only 
in the production of evidence that trial counsel can move to suppress later, 
then there is not an irrevocable effect on the trial, and the denial of effective 
counsel at the pretrial stage poses an episodic rather than a pervasive problem. 
The test focuses on whether the damage done through the violation of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel affects the proceedings so substantially 
and irrevocably that determining prejudice would be difficult. 
In fact, when structural ineffectiveness problems arise during the trial 
itself, some lower courts have given a bit more guidance about the line 
between episodic and pervasive ineffectiveness. There are a number of cases 
 
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). The entire trial is affected and contaminated 
when an attorney never consults with her client. 
 220. See United States v. Owen, 407 F.3d 222, 226-27 (4th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing the 
arraignment process at issue in Hamilton from North Carolina’s arraignment process 
and noting that the defendant “did not irrevocably waive any defenses or make any 
irreversible admissions of guilt, nor was he presented with the opportunity to execute 
any such irrevocable waiver or irreversible admission”). 
 221. Compare Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1970) (plurality opinion) (deeming the 
denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing an episodic structural error subject to 
Chapman), with White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam) (relying on 
Hamilton and automatically reversing as structural error the denial of counsel at a 
preliminary hearing). In Coleman, the Court noted that the “purposes of [an Alabama] 
preliminary hearing are to determine whether there is sufficient evidence against the 
accused to warrant presenting his case to the grand jury and . . . to fix bail.” 399 U.S. at 8. 
As a result, “the accused is not required to advance any defenses, and failure to do so 
does not preclude him from availing himself of every defense he may have upon the 
trial of the case.” Id. (quoting Coleman v. State, 211 So. 2d 917, 921 (Ala. Ct. App. 1968), 
vacated, 399 U.S. 1). In contrast, the defendant in White pleaded guilty without counsel 
at his preliminary hearing. 373 U.S. at 59. He was later appointed counsel and withdrew 
the guilty plea, but his admission at the preliminary hearing was used against him at 
his subsequent trial. Id. at 60. Given the circumstances of that preliminary hearing, the 
Court did “not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted.” Id. Lower courts should 
avoid making broad statements suggesting that the denial of counsel at all preliminary 
hearings or all arraignments are instances of episodic structural ineffectiveness subject 
to Chapman harmless error review. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 903 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Mich. 
2017) (describing Coleman as holding that the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing 
is subject to harmless error review). Instead, they should consider what actually 
happens at preliminary hearings or arraignments in their state and determine if the 
deprivation of counsel at the preliminary hearing or arraignment “affected—and 
contaminated—the entire criminal proceeding.” See Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257. 
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involving allegations of structural ineffectiveness where trial judges start trials 
or restart trial proceedings without defense counsel present. These cases range 
from situations where defense counsel missed seven minutes (eighteen 
questions) of the direct examination of a prosecution witness222 to cases where 
defense counsel missed days of testimony.223 Unwilling to impose a rule of 
automatic reversal for very brief absences, some courts have adopted a 
“substantial portion” test to determine the dividing line between episodic and 
pervasive ineffectiveness.224 Originally created in the personal ineffectiveness 
context, the substantial portion test requires courts to conduct a case-by-case 
analysis and ask how much of the trial the lawyer missed, what proportion of 
the trial was missed, and the significance of the portion missed.225 If the 
resulting analysis leads the court to conclude that a substantial portion of the 
trial was missed, then the error is pervasive; if not, then it is episodic. 
The fact that these lower courts use the same test to measure the dividing 
line between episodic and pervasive ineffectiveness for personal and structural 
ineffectiveness makes sense. In both contexts, the courts are attempting to 
understand how much of the trial process was affected by the alleged 
ineffectiveness. The source of the ineffectiveness has no bearing on whether it 
was episodic or pervasive even if it might have a bearing on the ease of 
obtaining a postconviction remedy.226 Instead, the question is whether the trial 
was substantially and irrevocably affected by trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. If 
so, prejudice should be presumed and reversal should be automatic. 
 
 222. See United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1137 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also Sweeney v. 
United States, 766 F.3d 857, 859, 861 (8th Cir. 2014) (describing a situation where 
defense counsel missed three minutes of a thirteen-day trial); United States v. Kaid, 502 
F.3d 43, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (describing how the trial judge started trial 
proceedings after the lunch break without waiting for counsel for one of the 
codefendants, resulting in defense counsel missing twenty minutes of the government’s 
direct examination of a prosecution witness). 
 223. See, e.g., Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 565-66 (6th Cir. 2000) (describing trial 
counsel’s absences as “excessive” and noting that he missed two days of prosecution-
witness testimony); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 769-70 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(addressing a case where counsel was absent for two days of his client’s trial, missing 
the testimony of eighteen prosecution witnesses). 
 224. See, e.g., Roy, 855 F.3d at 1164-66. For a more extended discussion of the substantial 
portion test, see Part IV.B.1 below. 
 225. Roy, 855 F.3d at 1164-66. 
 226. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (requiring a defendant 
alleging episodic personal ineffectiveness to show a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome), with sources cited supra note 80 (noting that, for episodic structural 
ineffectiveness problems, prejudice is presumed and the only question when the claim 
is raised posttrial is whether the Sixth Amendment violation was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt under Chapman). 
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C. The Timing of Structural Ineffectiveness Claims 
When a structural ineffectiveness challenge should be raised is almost as 
important as the content of the challenge itself. The timing of a structural 
challenge affects the likelihood of success as well as the potential remedies. 
Most structural ineffectiveness claims should be raised pretrial, when litigants 
will not face the procedural and substantive obstacles that posttrial claims 
often confront227 and creative remedies are still possible.228 
Ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest can help defenders raise 
pretrial structural ineffectiveness challenges. In Holloway v. Arkansas, the 
Supreme Court made it clear that trial courts rely on defense attorneys as 
officers of the court to bring possible conflicts of interest to the court’s 
attention.229 In Mickens v. Taylor, the Court further held that there should be 
automatic reversal when a trial court denies a defense attorney’s timely request 
to have different counsel appointed based on a conflict of interest (assuming a 
conflict exists).230 The American Bar Association (ABA) has issued a formal 
ethical opinion indicating that criminal defense attorneys who face excessive 
caseloads that will interfere with their abilities to provide competent and 
diligent representation face a conflict of interest and are ethically bound (1) not 
to accept new clients and (2) to move to withdraw from existing cases until 
their caseload gets to a point where they can provide ethical representation.231 
Defense attorneys should rely on this and other national and local standards of 
performance to refuse new cases and withdraw from cases when their 
caseloads are excessive. 
 
 227. See supra Part II. 
 228. See Chiang, supra note 168, at 450-56 (arguing that more lawyers should raise pretrial 
challenges to structural obstacles that interfere with their abilities to represent their 
clients). 
 229. 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978). 
 230. 535 U.S. 162, 168, 174 (2002). 
 231. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 4-5 (2006) 
(discussing the “ethical obligations of lawyers who represent indigent criminal 
defendants when excessive caseloads interfere with competent and diligent 
representation” (capitalization altered)); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR 
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-1.8 (4th ed. 2017), https://perma.cc/EVL8-W9H6; 
AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, EIGHT 
GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS guideline 1 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/SK7J-FP4Q (imposing similar obligations); AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING 
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM princ. 2 (2002), https://perma.cc/KCC5-84U8; AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF 
DEFS., NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, STATEMENT ON CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS 
(2007); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION guideline 1.3(a) (2006), https://perma.cc/V34G-Q4HU. 
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These motions can be made by individual defenders or more systematically 
by defender offices. For example, the Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit in Florida successfully filed motions “in twenty-one criminal cases 
seeking to be relieved of the obligations to represent indigent defendants in 
non-capital felony cases.”232 Each motion certified that the defender had a 
conflict of interest resulting from excessive caseloads caused by underfunding, 
which “meant the office could not carry out its legal and ethical obligations to 
the defendants.”233 The Supreme Court of Florida held that these motions were 
proper.234 When such motions are granted in large numbers of cases, it can 
catalyze legislative action to remedy the severe underfunding that causes the 
caseload crisis.235 
Individual defenders can also think about other remedies to address 
pretrial structural ineffectiveness problems. Attorneys facing excessive 
caseloads that are the result of a lack of funding can ask for continuances to be 
able to adequately prepare for trial, and they can further ask that those 
continuances be charged to the state for speedy trial purposes and that the 
clients, if incarcerated, be released pending trial. Attorneys can also ask for 
cases to be reassigned to private counsel who do not face structural obstacles to 
providing effective assistance. If cases are continued for too long, defense 
attorneys can move to dismiss those cases citing speedy trial concerns.236 
If the ineffectiveness is more episodic, the remedies can be episodic as well. 
Consider how pretrial, episodic structural ineffectiveness challenges are 
addressed at trial. Once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, if a 
state deprives a criminal defendant of an attorney at a critical pretrial stage, the 
defense attorney who comes in later can move at trial to suppress any evidence 
that the state obtained from that critical pretrial stage.237 If, as Powell v. Alabama 
suggests, the pretrial period between arraignment and trial is a critical stage,238 
and if a defendant is denied an attorney’s assistance during part of that period, 
 
 232. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265, 274-79 (Fla. 2013); see 
also State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 886-88, 890 (Mo. 2009) 
(granting similar relief); Stephen F. Hanlon, Case Refusal: A Duty for a Public Defender 
and a Remedy for All of a Public Defender’s Clients, 51 IND. L. REV. 59, 77-87 (2018) 
(discussing the benefits of case refusal). 
 233. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 115 So. 3d at 265. 
 234. Id. at 268-74. 
 235. See id. at 274 (discussing how these motions have been successful in stimulating reform 
in some jurisdictions). 
 236. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972). 
 237. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71, 473 (1981); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 236-37 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964). 
 238. 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
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perhaps trial counsel should argue that any evidence that the state obtained 
during that period should be suppressed. 
And what if structural problems prevent the defense attorney from being 
able to find and obtain evidence favorable to the defense due to late 
appointment or excessive caseloads? Depending on what the evidence is, courts 
could craft creative remedies. For example, if the defense attorney’s late 
appointment means that the defense attorney is structurally unable to retest a 
DNA sample or have a defense expert analyze that evidence, perhaps the 
appropriate remedy is to prevent the state from relying on the evidence. In 
United States v. Ash, when the Supreme Court talked about what constitutes a 
critical stage, it discussed the fact that defense counsel cannot duplicate lineups 
or preliminary hearings and noted that “the possibility of duplication may be 
important.”239 Part of the reason why obtaining a handwriting exemplar from 
a defendant is not a “critical stage” is because defense counsel can obtain 
additional exemplars for analysis and comparison.240 To the extent that a 
structural impediment prevents defense counsel from being able to perform 
that duplicating function, there is room to argue that the stage is now critical 
and that counsel’s inability to participate in the testing and inability to 
duplicate it means that the evidence should be suppressed.241 
When defense attorneys are forced to go to trial in cases that they have not 
been able to adequately prepare for due to structural problems, they should ask 
for other trial-related remedies. For example, they could try to present expert 
testimony about the structural problems endemic to that indigent defense 
system in an effort to educate jurors about the limits of defenders’ abilities to 
represent clients adequately and encourage jurors to take that into account.242 
Alternatively, they could request jury instructions that inform the jurors about 
the structural problems that defense counsel faced and permit jurors to view 
the evidence through that lens.243 The Supreme Court has given trial courts a 
 
 239. 413 U.S. 300, 318 n.10 (1973). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Cf. Wade, 388 U.S. at 239 (noting that stages can move in or out of being deemed critical 
on the basis of what state or government actions are taken to otherwise protect the 
defendants’ underlying rights). 
 242. Experts are used in other contexts to educate jurors about possible misperceptions of 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1113 (Utah 2009) (noting that trial 
courts should sometimes permit expert testimony on the dangers of misidentification 
in criminal cases involving stranger identifications). Admittedly, there may be ethical 
questions about how to introduce this kind of expert testimony without making the 
defense attorney a witness in the case. 
 243. Jury instructions are often used to encourage jurors to be skeptical of certain kinds of 
testimony or evidence in other contexts. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 
246 & n.7 (2012) (collecting examples of jury instructions cautioning against eyewitness 
footnote continued on next page 
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lot of flexibility in crafting remedies for constitutional ineffectiveness in the 
plea bargaining context.244 Litigants should not be afraid to push trial courts to 
be creative in crafting pretrial and trial remedies for structural ineffectiveness 
as well. 
IV. Revisiting Personal Ineffectiveness After Strickland 
Perhaps because the personal ineffectiveness doctrine has been entangled 
with the structural forms of ineffectiveness, courts and scholars have not 
adequately addressed how much personal ineffectiveness doctrine has changed 
in recent years. A detailed review of the Supreme Court case law reveals that 
Strickland ’s two-pronged test has more defense-friendly layers to it than 
scholars and courts have recognized. The failure to recognize these 
developments means that personal ineffectiveness doctrine is not being used by 
litigants or courts to its full potential. Instead, many courts reject personal 
ineffectiveness challenges as a matter of course, assuming that the Strickland 
test always requires granting deference to attorney decisionmaking and 
finding outcome-determinative prejudice.245 
Courts’ failure to properly analyze personal ineffectiveness challenges has 
a number of negative effects. First, it encourages (or at the very least does not 
check) poor trial attorney performance. As I and others have pointed out, the 
structural deficiencies that currently plague indigent defense delivery systems 
have cultural consequences.246 In many places, defense lawyers have been 
conditioned (and even forced) through economic pressure and courtroom 
practices to provide constitutionally inadequate representation to their 
clients.247 Even if these structural impediments are lifted, the learned 
 
testimony); Comm. on Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Mich. Supreme Court, 
Michigan Model Criminal Jury Instructions 5-16 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/WAN2-
VL4V (reminding jurors not to give special credibility to police witness testimony). 
 244. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170-72 (2012) (trusting lower courts to exercise 
discretion with respect to remedies). 
 245. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 196, at 1572-78. 
 246. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Essay, An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st 
Century, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 81, 85-86 (describing the “cynicism 
and disillusionment” that public defenders develop); Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a 
Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1769-70 (2016) (describing 
how many defense attorneys fail to perform their role effectively because the system 
and its pressures “beat the fight out of them”); Jonathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds 
of Change: Using Organizational Culture to Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 
177, 181, 191-92 (2008) (explaining how the financial and structural forces of indigent 
defense delivery systems shape the culture of defender offices, and noting how some 
defender offices develop a “shoot from the hip” attitude and a sense that “fidelity to the 
judge is paramount”). 
 247. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 246, at 1788-89. 
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helplessness that these systems have created will be resistant to change.248 
Stated differently, structural ineffectiveness problems can and do, over time, 
create at least some personally ineffective lawyers. Lawyers who have learned 
not to investigate their cases or perform basic legal research may by habit 
continue to perform inadequately even after structural impediments are lifted. 
A robust personal ineffectiveness doctrine is necessary to check the 
development and continuation of these habits once structural obstacles to 
effective representation are removed. 
Personal ineffectiveness review is also necessary to prevent wrongful 
convictions of innocent people. Scientific advances in DNA testing have 
spurred a wave of exonerations and catalyzed a movement focused on 
preventing wrongful convictions.249 Scholars who study exonerations have 
learned that one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions is ineffective 
defense lawyers.250 Addressing personal ineffectiveness is accordingly 
important to prevent false convictions. 
It is also important in cases where the defendants are guilty. Procedural 
justice matters: The legitimacy of the criminal justice system is predicated on 
the public’s feeling that the system treats people fairly.251 If people do not 
believe that the system is fair, they will be less inclined to respect its results. 
 
 248. Because of the structural problems that plague many defender organizations, 
defendants are depersonalized and their cases triaged. Many defenders get worn down 
and come to believe that there is no point in trying to effectuate change because 
nothing they do will change the system’s outputs. Cf. Steven F. Maier & Martin E.P. 
Seligman, Learned Helplessness: Theory and Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 
16-19 (1976) (documenting the psychological phenomenon of learned helplessness, 
which describes how people who face uncontrollable outcomes can become “seriously 
debilitated” and ultimately give in and adapt their behavior to conform to the 
environment). These lawyers learn not to ask for investigative or expert assistance 
because they believe that their requests won’t be granted due to budget constraints. 
They accept that their caseloads will be too high, that they will need to plead 
defendants’ cases without ever having investigated the charges, and that they won’t 
have time to file important motions or adequately prepare cases. Without adequate 
training and supervision, the status quo perpetuates itself. See Primus, supra note 246, at 
1773-74. New attorneys who enter the system learn by watching those who came 
before them, and the necessary lack of zealous, client-centered advocacy gets passed on. 
See id.  
 249. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions, in REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE—VOLUME 3: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES, supra note 2, at 193, 193 
(describing these developments). 
 250. See id. at 208; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 165-67 (2011) (documenting how ineffective 
defense lawyers have failed to adequately challenge evidence that leads to wrongful 
convictions). 
 251. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161-78 (2006) (arguing that 
whether people deem the law to be legitimate affects their tendency to comply with 
the law and explaining how unfair procedures undermine legitimacy). 
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That disrespect in turn encourages lawlessness.252 To be sure, people who are 
convicted of crimes might not be expected to sing the praises of the system, no 
matter how procedurally fair it is. But indigent criminal defendants, like most 
people, generally know the difference between being treated fairly and being 
railroaded. In the system as it currently operates, indigent defendants often 
complain that their trial attorneys do not communicate with them and assume 
from the outset that they are guilty.253 That would be problematic “in any 
system that wants to be perceived as legitimate, and it is particularly 
problematic in an adversarial system that relies on zealous defenders to justify 
its results.”254 So in sum, personal trial attorney ineffectiveness generates 
disrespect for the system and undermines the legitimacy of its results. 
For all these reasons, courts need to take seriously claims of personal as 
well as structural ineffectiveness. And recent developments in both the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts suggest that personal ineffectiveness is 
more complicated than many currently understand. 
A. The Deficient Performance Prong 
Courts and scholars routinely cite Strickland and say that, to prevail on a 
claim of personal trial attorney ineffectiveness (whether pervasive or 
personal), a defendant must first show that trial counsel’s performance was 
deficient, meaning that the attorney performed unreasonably given prevailing 
norms of practice.255 These experts fail to recognize that the Supreme Court 
has implicitly created three different tests, not one, for assessing deficient 
performance in personal ineffectiveness cases. As the following table 
demonstrates, some kinds of attorney errors give rise to a conclusive 
presumption of deficient performance, others create a rebuttable presumption 
of deficient performance, and only those that remain are judged under 
Strickland ’s highly deferential reasonableness analysis.256  
 
 252. See id. 
 253. Primus, supra note 2, at 128-30. 
 254. See id. at 129-30. 
 255. See, e.g., Dubose v. United States, 213 A.3d 599, 602 (D.C. 2019) (“The proper measure of 
attorney performance is ‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” 
(quoting Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C. 2007) (en banc))); see also 
Pavatt v. Carpenter, 928 F.3d 906, 931 (10th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. 
Pavatt v. Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 958 (2020); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to 
Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1087-88 (2006); 
Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1144 (2011). 
 256. Many scholars rightly criticize Strickland ’s deficient performance inquiry, arguing that 
the Strickland presumption that defense counsel’s choices are strategic is too strong and 
that the Court’s refusal to adopt a checklist for attorney performance has left the 
standard too vague. See, e.g., Chhablani, supra note 12, at 2-3 (describing scholars’ 
footnote continued on next page 
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Table 1 
Tests for Deficient Trial Attorney Performance 
Governing Legal Test Examples 
Conclusive Presumption 
of Deficient Performance 
Conflicts of Interest 
 Defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of 
interest by representing multiple clients, conflict 
affected counsel’s choices or actions in representing 




 Defense counsel failed to perform a task that was 
either necessary to assist the client in making 
decisions that were reserved to the client or 
required to execute the client’s wishes with respect 
to decisions that were reserved for the client.258 
 Defense counsel withheld important information 
necessary for the client to make decisions that were 
reserved for the client.259 
 Defense counsel affirmatively misled or misinformed 
the client in clearly erroneous ways about legal 
consequences that would flow from making decisions 
that were reserved for the client.260 
 
Clear Errors of Law 
 Defense counsel’s actions were motivated by a 
clearly erroneous understanding of the law rather 
than any strategic concern.261 
 
criticisms of the doctrine); Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, Note, Wiggins v. Smith: The 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard Applied Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 755, 764-65 (2004) (criticizing the strong presumption against the 
defendant). I agree with many of these critiques, but they apply only to the category of 
cases where Strickland ’s deferential standard is the governing test. 
 257. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980); id. at 356 & n.3 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 258. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 745-46 (2019); McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 
1509 (2018); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477-80 (2000). 
 259. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359, 368-
69 (2010). 
 260. See Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967-69 (2017); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69. 
 261. See Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 273-74 (2014) (per curiam); Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 395 (2000); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986). 
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Governing Legal Test Examples 
Rebuttable Presumption of 
Deficient Performance 
 Failure to investigate (at least in capital cases).262 
Strickland ’s 
Reasonableness Analysis 
 All other attorney errors not included in the 
conclusive presumption of deficient performance or 
rebuttable presumption of deficient performance 
categories.263 
 
Litigants and courts could profit from recognizing and further developing 
these three different tests rather than treating the most familiar apparatus—
Strickland deference—as if it were generally applicable. I do not want to 
overstate this phenomenon: In several areas, amorphous reasonableness review 
with baked-in deference to defense counsel’s choices remains prevalent and 
makes claims of ineffective assistance extremely difficult to win. But in a 
nontrivial number of circumstances, there is a presumption of attorney 
incompetence and a de facto partial checklist for defense attorney 
performance. Instead of lamenting Strickland as the prosecution’s shield against 
claims of ineffective assistance, maybe it is time to wield Strickland 
affirmatively as a sword by discovering ways to expand these more promising 
aspects of its doctrine. 
1. A conclusive presumption of deficient performance 
Looking at the Supreme Court’s personal ineffectiveness cases since 
Strickland, a clear hierarchy emerges. First, contrary to language in Supreme 
Court opinions suggesting there is no checklist for attorney performance and 
no list of per se counsel obligations, some failures by defense counsel give rise 
to a de facto, conclusive presumption of deficient performance. These 
conclusive presumption cases fall into three categories. 
The first category includes the conflict-of-interest cases. Once a defendant 
demonstrates that (a) trial counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest 
by representing multiple clients with conflicting interests, (b) the conflict 
affected counsel’s choices or actions with respect to the representation of the 
defendant, and (c) the defendant did not consent to the multiple representation, 
the court will automatically find deficient performance.264 “Defense counsel 
 
 262. See Andrus v. Texas, No. 18-9674, 2020 WL 3146872, at *4-8 (U.S. June 15, 2020) (per 
curiam); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 31, 39-40 (2009) (per curiam); Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-90 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-29 (2003); 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 396; see also infra notes 295-99 and accompanying text. 
 263. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003) (per curiam). 
 264. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980) (“In order to establish a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate 
footnote continued on next page 
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have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise 
the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of 
trial.”265 The failure to avoid an actual conflict of interest is per se deficient.266 
The second category involves cases that infringe on clients’ autonomy 
with respect to decisions that are reserved for them. For example, if counsel 
fails to perform a discrete, almost ministerial task that is (a) necessary to assist 
the defendant in making decisions that are reserved for the client or (b) required 
to execute the client’s wishes with respect to decisions that are reserved for the 
client, that is per se deficient.267 This includes cases where defense counsel 
withholds important information necessary for the client to make such 
decisions268 and cases where defense counsel affirmatively misleads or 
misinforms the client in clearly erroneous ways about the legal consequences 
that will flow from making such decisions.269 Those decisions include whether 
to plead guilty or go to trial, whether to have a jury trial or bench trial, 
whether to testify at trial or remain silent, and whether to pursue or forgo an 
appeal.270 Defense counsel has specific ministerial duties that she must perform 
to aid the client in making and executing the client’s decisions in these 
situations. For example, the Supreme Court has held that when the prosecution 
 
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”); see also 
id. at 346-47 (noting that a client can “knowingly accept such risk”). 
 265. Id. at 346; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (explaining that 
“counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest”). 
 266. The defendant has to show that there is an actual conflict that adversely affected the 
attorney’s choices or actions with respect to the defendant. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 
U.S. 162, 171, 172 n.5 (2002); Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. But once an actual conflict is 
apparent, the lawyer’s failure to redress it by obtaining a waiver of the conflict from 
the client, withdrawing from the representation, or asking the court for help to avoid 
the conflict (by, for example, appointing new counsel) is per se deficient. See Cuyler, 446 
U.S. at 348 (recognizing that an actual conflict of interest that adversely affects an 
attorney’s performance violates the Sixth Amendment). 
 267. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 745-46 (2019); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477-
80 (2000). 
 268. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-69 
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makes a favorable plea offer, defense counsel has a duty to convey that offer in 
order to permit the client to decide whether to plead or not.271 If counsel fails 
to convey a favorable plea offer to her client, that is per se deficient 
performance because it prevents the client from being able to exercise her 
right to choose a plea or a trial.272 The reasons the attorney might have for 
failing to convey the offer do not matter. She has, by failing to convey the 
offer, taken away the client’s ability to make a choice that is reserved to the 
client, and her performance is per se deficient. Similarly, the Supreme Court 
has held that defense counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal when the client 
requests one is per se deficient performance.273 Once again, filing the notice of 
appeal is a purely ministerial act that defense counsel performs to effectuate 
the client’s wishes with respect to a decision that the client is entitled to make. 
The Supreme Court has also held that there is per se deficient performance 
when defense counsel withholds important information or provides 
information that is clearly legally erroneous to the client during plea 
negotiations. Counsel’s reasons for doing so do not matter, because the error 
infringes on the client’s ability to make an informed choice about what to do. 
For example, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer 
performs deficiently when she fails to advise a noncitizen client regarding the 
risk of deportation before that client enters into a plea that could result in 
deportation.274 Such information is critically important, easy to convey, and 
gives the client information that the client needs to make an informed choice 
about whether to proceed to trial or take a plea.275 
Recognizing that there is often little difference between errors of omission 
and errors of commission, the Court has also held that an attorney renders per 
se deficient performance when she misinforms a client by stating during plea 
negotiations that a plea would not subject the client to deportation when in fact 
it could.276 Any form of attorney advice or information that affirmatively 
misleads or misinforms the client about clear legal consequences that will flow 
from pleading guilty rather than going to trial should lead to a finding of 
deficient performance. For example, in Lafler v. Cooper the client expressed a 
willingness to plead until the defense attorney erroneously told him that he 
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could not be convicted of murder because the victim had been shot below the 
waist.277 That erroneous legal advice caused the client to reject the plea offer 
and go to trial.278 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the parties agreed 
that counsel’s performance had been deficient.279 By misinforming the client 
about the legal consequences of going to trial, counsel impermissibly infringed 
on the client’s ability to make an informed choice about what to do. 
The third category of cases in which the Court conclusively presumes 
deficient performance by a trial attorney comprises those cases where trial 
counsel’s actions are motivated by a clearly erroneous understanding of the law 
and not by any strategic concern.280 This category sometimes overlaps with 
the previous one. For example, Lafler could arguably fall into either category 
because defense counsel misled the defendant in that case due to a clearly 
erroneous understanding of the law on inferred intent.281 But the rationale for 
a conclusive presumption of deficient performance in the two categories is 
slightly different. When it comes to decisions that are reserved for the client, 
counsel has a duty to ensure that the client is able to make an informed 
decision and must perform the ministerial acts necessary to present the client 
with the available options and effectuate the client’s choices. Clear legal errors 
and omissions by counsel that interfere with the client’s ability to make 
informed choices infringe on that right and are per se deficient regardless of 
counsel’s reasons. In contrast, the third category of cases includes legal errors 
committed by counsel in areas beyond those reserved to the client. Because 
counsel is generally permitted to make strategic and tactical decisions, the 
attorney’s reasons matter here. As a result, only when counsel’s actions or 
omissions are motivated by a clearly erroneous understanding of the law will 
there be per se deficient performance in this last group of cases. 
Hinton v. Alabama282 provides a good example of this form of per se 
deficient performance. Hinton was alleged to have committed two murders 
and then a robbery with a gun.283 The restaurant manager from the robbery 
identified Hinton as the robber, and the police found the gun that he used for 
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the robbery.284 The only evidence connecting Hinton to the homicides was 
expert ballistics testimony linking that gun to the bullets used to commit the 
homicides.285 The defense attorney never retained a reputable ballistics expert, 
not for any strategic reason but because he mistakenly thought his available 
funding for an expert was capped at $1,000 and he could not find a good expert 
for that amount.286 The only “expert” he could find at that rate was not 
qualified and was thoroughly discredited at trial.287 Had he known that more 
money was available, defense counsel could have found a qualified defense 
expert to contest the State’s ballistics evidence.288 The Supreme Court deemed 
counsel’s performance deficient, noting that “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a 
point of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to 
perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example of 
unreasonable performance under Strickland.”289 
Consider also Kimmelman v. Morrison.290 The trial counsel in that case 
failed to file a motion to suppress evidence, not for any strategic reason but 
merely because he was unaware that the police had performed a search.291 He 
had done no investigation because he erroneously believed that the 
prosecution was legally required to turn over all of its inculpatory evidence.292 
As the Court put it, counsel’s actions “betray[ed] a startling ignorance of the 
law,”293 and his performance was per se deficient.294 
These cases reveal the Court’s underlying view that, to be reasonable,  
an attorney’s performance cannot be motivated by a clearly erroneous 
understanding of the law. Attorneys are charged with getting the law right (at 
least when the law is clear). If they make decisions based on clear legal error, 
those decisions are patently unreasonable and per se deficient. 
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2. A rebuttable presumption: Failure to investigate 
In Williams v. Taylor,295 Wiggins v. Smith,296 Rompilla v. Beard,297 and Porter v. 
McCollum,298 the Court held that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing 
to conduct an adequate investigation before a capital sentencing hearing. To be 
sure, these holdings do not articulate a rule that such failures to investigate are 
per se deficient. But they seem to recognize a rebuttable presumption of 
deficient performance. Much of the Court’s language in these cases seems to 
ignore the Strickland presumption that defense counsel’s decisions are strategic. 
In fact, these cases seem to flip that presumption, suggesting that the failure to 
investigate will result in a finding of deficient performance absent the 
government’s ability to make a strong showing of strategic reasons for the 
failure—at least in capital cases.299 
For example, in Rompilla, the Court explained various ways that defense 
counsel could have pursued a mitigation investigation and then noted that 
“trial counsel and the Commonwealth respond to these unexplored possibilities 
by emphasizing this Court’s recognition that the duty to investigate does not 
force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn 
up.”300 This presentation seems to put the onus on the government to explain 
the failure to investigate. The Court then faulted the defense attorney more 
specifically for failing to examine the court file containing information about 
the defendant’s prior convictions, knowing that the State would rely on those 
convictions as an aggravating factor in favor of death.301 The Court 
emphasized that investigating to obtain the information that the State has and 
will use against the defendant is more than just “common sense.”302 Indeed, the 
Court noted, “the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice in 
circulation at the time of Rompilla’s trial describes the obligation in terms no 
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one could misunderstand in the circumstances of a case like this one.”303 After 
quoting the standard, the Court then noted that “the Commonwealth has come 
up with no reason to think the quoted standard impertinent here.”304 The 
implicit premise of this analysis is that a failure to investigate is deficient 
performance absent some showing to the contrary. 
Rompilla is not the only Supreme Court case where the Court has 
apparently adopted a rebuttable presumption that the failure to investigate 
possible mitigation is deficient performance in a capital case. In Williams v. 
Taylor, the Court stated that counsel representing a client in a capital case has 
an “obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s 
background” and held that the failure to fulfill that obligation was deficient 
unless “justified by a tactical decision.”305 And in Porter v. McCollum, the Court 
reiterated that “[i]t is unquestioned that under the prevailing professional 
norms . . . , counsel had an ‘obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of 
the defendant’s background.’”306 
3. The totality-of-the-circumstances reasonableness analysis 
These cases stand in sharp contrast to the cases in which the Supreme 
Court subjects ineffective assistance allegations to a totality-of-the-
circumstances reasonableness analysis. The totality-of-the-circumstances 
reasonableness test comes from Strickland itself, where the Court instructed 
reviewing courts that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 
highly deferential” and courts should “indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”307 Prevailing norms of practice in professional standards may be 
guides for determining what is reasonable, but they “are only guides.”308 The 
“performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances.”309 
This approach looks quite different from the rebuttable-presumption and 
per se approaches. For example, the defendant in Yarborough v. Gentry alleged 
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that his trial attorney was ineffective because he gave a poor closing 
argument.310 The Supreme Court initially focused on what counsel had done 
during that closing argument and noted the facts the defendant raised that 
could have been (but were not) used by defense counsel in closing, but then 
noted that “[e]ven if some of the arguments would unquestionably have 
supported the defense, it does not follow that counsel was incompetent for 
failing to include them.”311 The Court then spoke about reasonable strategic 
choices to focus on a small number of points instead of pursuing a “shotgun 
approach” and noted that “there is a strong presumption that [counsel acted] for 
tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”312 The Court started with 
the assumption that counsel performed reasonably and strategically rather 
than with a presumption of deficiency.313 
4. Developing the three tests for deficient performance 
As these cases show, the Supreme Court has adopted three different 
approaches to assessing the reasonableness of trial attorney performance in 
personal ineffectiveness cases. Going forward, litigants and lower courts 
should recognize these three approaches and think about ways to flesh out 
their contours. 
First, lower courts should recognize that although the Strickland Court 
eschewed any reliance on “a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance,”314 the Supreme Court does have a mini-checklist of sorts. Some 
actions are per se problematic. The Supreme Court has been clearest about this 
in the multiple-representation conflict-of-interest cases. As a result, lower 
courts recognize that attorneys who violate the duty of loyalty through an 
actual conflict of interest involving multiple representation that affected 
counsel’s choices and actions are per se deficient.315 Lower courts should also 
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explicitly recognize that a trial attorney’s failure to perform tasks that are 
necessary to assist the defendant in making decisions that are reserved for the 
client or are necessary to execute the client’s wishes with respect to decisions 
that are reserved for the client will result in a conclusive presumption that the 
attorney’s performance was deficient under Strickland. They should also 
recognize that there is per se deficient performance when defense counsel 
withholds important information or provides important information that is 
clearly legally erroneous to the client during plea negotiations. 
Courts should then expand on these Supreme Court cases and recognize 
other similar tasks that would fall into these per se categories of deficiency. 
With respect to conflict-of-interest cases, lower courts have already begun to 
recognize that defense attorneys’ performance is deficient when actual 
conflicts of interest arise due to counsel’s obligations to former clients316 or 
counsel’s personal or financial interests.317 The source of the conflict should 
not matter. If a defense attorney is laboring under an actual conflict of interest 
that adversely affects her ability to represent the defendant, her failure to 
resolve that conflict by removing herself from the case, getting the client’s 
informed consent to waive the conflict, or asking the court to appoint other 
counsel to resolve the problem constitutes deficient performance. 
Lower courts should similarly think about logical implications of the 
other per se deficient performance categories. For example, counsel’s failure to 
discuss the right to a jury trial with a client or to inform the client of his right 
to testify at trial on his own behalf always should be deemed per se deficient 
performance. And when counsel gives advice that is clearly legally incorrect to 
a client who is trying to make a decision that the client is entitled to make, that 
too should be deemed per se deficient. For example, suppose an attorney 
informs a client who is trying to decide between a bench trial and a jury trial 
that he will be convicted by the jury if a bare majority of the jurors think he is 
guilty. That advice is clearly erroneous under the law because a jury must be 
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unanimous for the conviction to be constitutionally valid.318 Based on that 
advice, the client opts for a bench trial. That trial attorney’s performance 
should be deemed per se deficient because the attorney provided clearly legally 
erroneous information that affected the client’s decision to plead or go to 
trial.319 
Lower courts should also do more to flesh out what affirmative obligations 
trial attorneys have in terms of the advice that they need to convey to clients 
facing choices about whether to plead or go to trial, whether to opt for jury 
trials or bench trials, whether to testify or to remain silent, and whether to 
appeal. Does the trial attorney have an affirmative obligation to tell the client 
that if he chooses not to testify, the government cannot comment on his 
silence?320 Is a trial attorney’s performance per se deficient if she does not 
inform a client who has prior impeachable convictions about the danger that 
those convictions will be used against him if he chooses to testify? These are 
the kinds of questions that lower courts should be addressing when thinking 
about the category of cases where the Supreme Court has treated attorney 
errors as per se deficient. 
The Supreme Court recently held that, in addition to the decisions of 
whether to plead, have a jury, testify, and appeal, “it is the defendant’s 
prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his defense: to admit 
guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his 
innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”321 The lower courts should now be addressing what trial counsel’s 
responsibilities are to support the client in making decisions about the 
“objective of his defense.”322 Perhaps trial counsel has a duty to inform a client 
about the elements of the crime so that the defendant can decide if he is guilty 
or innocent. After all, without that information, how can the defendant 
rationally make a choice about the objectives of the defense? 
More also needs to be said about what kinds of deficient performance will 
trigger a rebuttable presumption of deficient performance. The answer might 
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be found in the definition of “prevailing norms of practice.” Recall that in 
Strickland, the Court held that trial counsel’s performance is deficient if the 
attorney performed unreasonably given prevailing norms of practice. It then 
noted that ABA standards are “guides” for determining prevailing norms, but 
that “[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily 
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel.”323 
In the years since Strickland, there has been some tension in the Court’s 
cases about how much deference to give to professional guidelines and state 
laws or rules when assessing trial attorney performance.324 In addition to 
concerns about the source of the standards—are they codified state standards 
that attorneys are required to follow or professional standards issued by 
private organizations that are more aspirational?—there are also questions 
about whether local or national standards are more appropriate benchmarks 
for determining prevailing norms of practice. At one point, the Supreme Court 
recognized that courts “may need to define with greater precision the weight to 
be given to recognized canons of ethics [and] the standards established by the 
state in statutes or professional codes” when addressing Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel challenges.325 Perhaps now is the time for 
lower courts to take up that invitation. Doing so might inform the dividing 
line between the rebuttable presumption cases and the totality-of-the 
circumstances reasonableness cases. 
The Court’s rebuttable presumption cases are riddled with references to 
and reliance on ABA guidelines and standards documenting defense counsel’s 
obligations to thoroughly investigate.326 Some scholars have gone so far as to 
suggest that these cases “stand for the proposition that the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice should be used as norms for determining what is objectively 
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reasonable representation.”327 Even though the Court does not view ABA 
guidelines as “inexorable commands” that trial attorneys must follow at the 
risk of being deemed ineffective,328 its recognition that these standards are 
important should not be taken lightly. 
I agree with those who have suggested that lower courts should look at a 
host of primary and secondary sources to determine what the prevailing 
norms of practice were at the time of trial.329 After all, if the analysis is 
supposed to ask whether counsel’s performance was reasonable given 
prevailing norms of practice, it is important to know what those norms were, 
and norms typically are not derived from just one source. Sources that courts 
should consult include, among other things, court decisions (including legal 
malpractice cases) describing existing professional norms at the time, state 
statutes or rules imposing duties and obligations on defense counsel, 
professional ethics opinions from bar associations, ABA guidelines and Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, guidelines from the National Legal Aid & 
Defender Association, local professional bar guidelines, training materials used 
by indigent defense providers to describe defense counsel’s obligations, 
standards issued by Indigent Defense Commissions, U.S. Department of Justice 
publications from the Office of Justice Programs, and law review articles and 
treatises describing professional norms. 
When multiple sources converge in imposing a particular duty on defense 
counsel, that duty should be considered a prevailing norm of practice. The 
stronger the convergence, the stronger the norm. At some point, when the 
sources all agree, the norm might be strong enough to justify a rebuttable 
presumption of deficiency if the attorney failed to comply with the norm. The 
Supreme Court has already endorsed an approach similar to this one in Padilla v. 
Kentucky.330 In finding that an attorney’s failure to advise her client regarding 
the risk of deportation was inconsistent with prevailing norms and thus 
deficient, the Court noted that “[a]uthorities of every stripe—including the 
American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, 
authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications—universally require 
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defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for non-
citizen clients.”331 
The fact that the presumption is rebuttable should respond adequately to 
some of the concerns raised in Strickland itself about imposing a rigid checklist 
for measuring attorney performance.332 A presumption that can be rebutted 
with evidence of a real strategic reason for failing to comply with the norm 
does not “interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of 
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions.”333 Nor does it “distract counsel from the overriding mission of 
vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause.”334 In fact, the sources’ universal 
acceptance of a norm of practice suggests that the mission of providing 
effective advocacy would be better served by recognizing the rebuttable 
presumption and sending a message that there is a preference for compliance 
with the norm in the vast majority of cases. 
Finally, when courts are looking at sources to determine what the 
prevailing professional norms were at the time of trial, they need to stop 
conflating personal and structural ineffectiveness. Some lower courts have 
defined the prevailing professional norms by looking to customary practice in 
a given jurisdiction.335 On this logic, if all of the defense attorneys in the 
jurisdiction have excessive caseloads such that they cannot investigate their 
cases pretrial, then no particular attorney is ineffective in failing to investigate: 
She is just acting in accordance with the prevailing community practice. This 
leveling-down approach is problematic because it uses structural problems in 
defense delivery systems to justify patently ineffective attorney performance. 
It insulates defense attorneys who join in community practices that ignore 
attorneys’ professional obligations to their clients. It also fails to incentivize 
attorneys to comply with their professional obligations and raise the level of 
representation to constitutionally acceptable levels. It has the perverse effect of 
discouraging defense attorneys from highlighting structural ineffectiveness 
problems that would, in turn, raise their own professional obligations. 
 
 331. Id. at 367 (quoting Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, & Criminal Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12-14, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356  
(No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1556546). 
 332. Cf. Chiang, supra note 168, at 469 (explaining that some scholars believe that checklists 
“sometimes set unrealistic goals for handling routine minor criminal cases and can be 
too vague to be helpful in a serious investigation into the adequacy of defense services” 
(quoting Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of 
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 336 (2002))). 
 333. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
 334. See id. 
 335. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Lawyering to the Lowest Common Denominator: Strickland’s 
Potential for Incorporating Underfunded Norms into Legal Doctrine, 5 FAULKNER L. REV. 
199, 213 (2014). 
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In short, doctrine in this area should be willing to treat norms as normative 
rather than solely as descriptive of the lowest common denominator of legal 
representation in a given jurisdiction.336 Instead, the reasonableness of 
counsel’s behavior needs to be measured against the performance that we 
would expect of an attorney who was complying with her constitutional 
obligations. As others have argued, this means that national standards (in addition 
to local ones) should inform courts’ assessments of prevailing professional 
norms.337 
B. The Prejudice Analysis 
Just as the deficient performance analysis is multilayered and has the 
potential to provide more robust review of trial attorney behavior than many 
have realized, the prejudice inquiry is multifaceted and need not be interpreted 
as stingily as some experts have suggested. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized that “the concept of prejudice is defined in different ways depending 
on the context in which it appears.”338 Whether a reviewing court will require 
the defendant to show actual prejudice or will presume prejudice “turns on the 
magnitude of the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel.”339 
When personal ineffectiveness is pervasive, prejudice is presumed. But when 
personal ineffectiveness is episodic, Strickland requires the defendant to 
demonstrate prejudice. The line between episodic and pervasive personal 
ineffectiveness is therefore important. But little attention has been paid to the 
case law discussing it.340 
Even when defendants bear the burden of demonstrating Strickland 
prejudice, recent legal developments suggest that outcome-determinative 
 
 336. See, e.g., Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1259, 1284 (1986) (arguing that, when measuring the objective reasonableness 
of attorney performance, courts should ask if the attorney’s performance was 
“commensurate with the prevailing notion of a competent attorney”). 
 337. See Sudeall Lucas, supra note 335, at 221. 
 338. See, e.g., Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1911 (2017). 
 339. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 482 (2000). 
 340. A few commentators have discussed the cases involving sleeping lawyers, but they 
often do not discuss the line between episodic and pervasive ineffectiveness more 
broadly. See, e.g., Matthew J. Fogelman, Justice Asleep Is Justice Denied: Why Dozing 
Defense Attorneys Demean the Sixth Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial, 26 
J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 99-100 (2002); Kimberly Sachs, Note, You Snooze, You Lose, and Your 
Client Gets a Retrial: United States v. Ragin and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Sleeping 
Lawyer Cases, 62 VILL. L. REV. 427, 454-55 (2017). But see Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, 
Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to Presume Prejudice from 
Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 863-80 (2003) (extending consideration of 
the sleeping lawyer cases to other forms of representational absence). 
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prejudice may not always be what defendants need to show.341 A showing that 
a trial was fundamentally unfair may suffice, even if that showing is not 
tantamount to showing that the result would have been different in the 
absence of a specific episode of attorney ineffectiveness. As a result, satisfying 
Strickland ’s prejudice requirement for personal ineffectiveness need not be as 
onerous as experts have assumed. 
1. Pervasive versus episodic personal ineffectiveness 
Prejudice is presumed when personal ineffectiveness infects an entire 
proceeding. Such pervasive ineffectiveness demonstrates a breakdown in the 
adversarial process, and the effects of such a breakdown are impossible to 
measure.342 But when is counsel’s deficient performance serious enough to be 
deemed pervasive? The Supreme Court has not provided much guidance in 
answering this question. It has found personal ineffectiveness to be pervasive 
in only two kinds of cases: (1) cases in which trial counsel represented multiple 
clients with conflicting interests and the conflict of interest affected counsel’s 
choices or actions vis-à-vis the defendants,343 and (2) cases in which trial 
counsel violated the client’s autonomy by failing to follow the client’s wishes 
with respect to a decision that was reserved for the client.344 Outside of the 
conflict-of-interest and client-autonomy spheres, the Supreme Court has never 
deemed personal ineffectiveness pervasive. 
In Bell v. Cone, the Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s claim that his 
attorney’s personal ineffectiveness at the sentencing phase of his capital 
murder trial was pervasive enough to exempt the defendant from having to 
demonstrate prejudice specifically.345 Even though defense counsel had not 
 
 341. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 342. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 179 (2004) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
648, 659 (1984)). 
 343. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980). 
 344. These cases fall into two subcategories. The first includes cases where counsel failed to 
file a notice of appeal when the client had or would have requested one. See, e.g., Garza v. 
Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2019); Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 479-80. All the defendant 
needs to show in these cases is that there is a reasonable probability that he would have 
appealed but for counsel’s deficient performance. There is no required demonstration 
of a likelihood of success on appeal because it would be fundamentally unfair to 
deprive defendants of the appellate process due to trial counsel’s failure. See Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484. The second category includes McCoy v. Louisiana, where the 
Court held that defense counsel performed deficiently by failing to adhere to the 
client’s desire to maintain his innocence and determine the fundamental objective of 
his capital defense. 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1510-11 (2018). 
 345. 535 U.S. 685, 696-98 (2002). 
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presented a mitigation case346 or made a closing argument at the penalty 
phase,347 the Supreme Court refused to presume prejudice, noting that 
[w]hen we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an 
attorney’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case, we indicated that the attorney’s 
failure must be complete. . . . Here, [the defendant’s] argument is not that his 
counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the sentencing proceeding as 
a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points. For purposes of 
distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, this difference is 
not of degree but of kind.348 
Cone demonstrates the importance of being able to draw the line between 
episodic personal ineffectiveness (which requires the defendant to demonstrate 
prejudice) and pervasive personal effectiveness (which presumes prejudice). As 
applied to specific cases, the distinction can be difficult to apply. But it cannot 
be true, as the Supreme Court suggested in Cone, that specific failures—no 
matter how numerous or substantial—are different in kind from pervasive 
ones. If the specific failures are numerous or substantial enough, they can lead 
to a pervasive breakdown. 
In fact, the Supreme Court recently seemed to acknowledge that pervasive 
personal ineffectiveness can result from specific, isolated errors. In Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, the Court was faced with a claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the closure of the courtroom during voir 
dire.349 When analyzing the claim, the Court agreed that trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient and indicated that prejudice would be presumed if 
the deficient performance “pervade[d] the whole trial.”350 Though the Court 
ultimately rejected Weaver’s claim,351 its willingness to ask whether a single 
error could result in a presumption of prejudice demonstrates that, even when 
counsel does not “fail[] to oppose the prosecution throughout the . . . proceeding 
as a whole,”352 one serious error can sometimes lead to a breakdown in the 
adversarial process that renders the trial fundamentally unfair.353 But neither 
 
 346. He had called mitigation-related witnesses in his attempt to raise an insanity defense at 
the guilt phase of the trial. See id. at 690-92. 
 347. Id. at 692. 
 348. Id. at 696-97; see also Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 124 n.* (2008) (per 
curiam). 
 349. 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2017). 
 350. Id. at 1912-13. 
 351. Id. at 1913. 
 352. Cone, 535 U.S. at 697. 
 353. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (describing in the structural ineffectiveness 
context how one error—not having counsel at arraignment—can infect the subsequent 
proceedings). Some scholars have argued that there should be per se categories of 
pervasive ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Mark Loudon-Brown, Garbage In, Garbage Out: 
Revising Strickland as Applied to Forensic Science Evidence, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 895 
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the Court in Cone nor the Court in Weaver gave any guidance about when 
counsel’s errors cross the line into that pervasive category. 
Lower appellate courts have been partially filling that void, particularly in 
a series of cases involving defense attorneys who have fallen asleep during 
trial.354 Falling asleep is a form of personal ineffectiveness; neither the 
government nor the system forces sleep upon defense counsel.355 But it can be 
episodic or pervasive: Though it is problematic for an attorney to fall asleep at 
all during a legal proceeding, the effect of an attorney’s nodding off for a brief 
moment is often different from the effect of an attorney’s sleeping through an 
entire trial.356 Lower courts in the sleeping-attorney cases have accordingly 
adopted a “substantial portion” test to determine when the deficient performance 
in those cases is pervasive enough to merit a presumption of prejudice.357 If 
defense counsel falls asleep for a brief period, a reviewing court can look at the 
record to see what the attorney missed and then perform a prejudice analysis 
under Strickland. But if an attorney sleeps through a substantial portion of the 
trial, a meaningful prejudice inquiry is impossible.358 As one lower court put 
the point, “[w]hether a lawyer slept for a substantial portion of the trial should 
 
(2018) (arguing that if an attorney is deficient “in combating incriminating forensic 
science evidence, Strickland prejudice should be presumed”). 
 354. See Sachs, supra note 340, at 441 (summarizing the lower court rules). 
 355. One could make arguments about the fatigue that results from being overworked, but 
such arguments would stretch the idea of structural ineffectiveness beyond its useful 
shape. 
 356. See United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1160 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (noting that “the 
rule is not ‘any is all,’ nor is it ‘all or nothing’”). Compare Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 
623-24 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that counsel was asleep “for a brief period” and holding 
that counsel must be asleep for a “substantial portion” of the trial to merit relief), with 
United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 615, 621-23 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that counsel was 
“frequently” asleep for substantial portions of the trial, resulting in a constructive 
denial of counsel), Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(similar), Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685-87 (2d Cir. 1996) (similar), and Javor v. 
United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834-35 (9th Cir. 1984) (similar). 
 357. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 619 (agreeing with other circuits in holding that “a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when that defendant’s counsel is asleep 
during a substantial portion of the defendant’s trial” and that a presumption of prejudice 
is required); Muniz, 647 F.3d at 623 (joining the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, 
which “have held that the denial of counsel with presumed prejudice only occurs once 
counsel sleeps through a ‘substantial portion of [defendant’s] trial’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Javor, 724 F.2d at 834)); Burdine, 262 F.3d at 348-49 (finding that 
“defense counsel slept during substantial portions” of the trial and in those circumstances 
the court “must presume prejudice”); Javor, 724 F.2d at 834-35 (holding that “when a 
defendant’s attorney is asleep during a substantial portion of his trial, the defendant has 
not received the legal assistance necessary” and prejudice must be presumed); cf. Tippins, 
77 F.3d at 685-87 (adopting a similar “repeatedly unconscious” or “repeated and 
prolonged lapses” test (capitalization altered)). 
 358. See Roy, 855 F.3d at 1154-55. 
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be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering, but not limited to, the 
length of time counsel slept, the proportion of the trial missed, and the 
significance of the portion counsel slept through.”359 
The substantial-portion test suggests a potentially generalizable way of 
determining when an error (or series of errors) should be treated as pervasive. 
Courts faced with allegations of pervasive personal ineffectiveness should look 
at the sum total of the lawyer’s alleged errors and ask how long the errors 
lasted, how much of the trial they infected, and how significant those parts of 
the trial were to the case.360 If numerous errors infected many different and 
significant parts of the case, it is reasonable to conclude that the attorney 
“entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing.”361 It would be incredibly difficult for a reviewing court to 
meaningfully assess prejudice in those circumstances, and a presumption of 
prejudice is warranted. 
Some lower courts have begun to consider the sum total of counsel’s errors 
in this way. Consider, for example, a Connecticut appellate court’s approach in 
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction.362 In a first-degree assault case, trial 
counsel failed to seek an additional competency evaluation, failed to cross-
examine five of the six prosecution witnesses, and failed to investigate a 
possible alibi defense.363 When the defendant later raised a personal 
ineffectiveness challenge to his conviction, the appellate court agreed that trial 
counsel’s ineffectiveness was pervasive enough to merit a presumption of 
prejudice.364 By “declining to cross-examine the victim and her children and 
failing to investigate his alibi . . . [counsel] failed to subject the state’s case 
against the petitioner to any meaningful adversarial testing.”365 It was clear to 
the reviewing court that trial counsel “had already determined that the 
petitioner was the perpetrator and that he would be convicted.”366 This 
translated into an “utter lack of advocacy” that infected the entire trial 
 
 359. Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 n.11. One circuit has also suggested that another factor, which is 
already implicit in this analysis, is “whether the specific part of the trial that counsel 
missed is known or can be determined.” Roy, 855 F.3d at 1162. One author has argued 
that prejudice should be presumed whenever counsel sleeps through “a critical portion 
of trial.” Sachs, supra note 340, at 453-54. 
 360. Cf. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 340, at 876-80 (discussing how, when assessing 
prejudice in cases of representational absence, courts should consider the length of 
counsel’s absence and whether critical moments of the trial were missed). 
 361. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
 362. 194 A.3d 329 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). 
 363. Id. at 331. 
 364. Id. at 333-36. 
 365. Id. at 336. 
 366. Id. 
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proceeding.367 More courts should be willing to consider the combined effect 
of all of trial counsel’s deficient performance and presume prejudice when an 
utter lack of advocacy infected substantial portions of the proceedings. 
2. Prejudice need not be outcome determinative 
When trial attorney errors are episodic rather than pervasive, the 
prevailing view is that to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”368 But Strickland itself cautioned 
against applying the prejudice inquiry in a “mechanical” fashion.369 According 
to the Strickland Court, “the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding.”370 In Weaver, the Court assumed that, 
even absent a showing of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, relief 
might still be available if the defendant could show that the attorney’s errors 
were “so serious as to render [the] trial fundamentally unfair.”371 
Justin Murray and I have proposed that, after Weaver, criminal defendants 
should argue (and courts should recognize) that an attorney’s episodic deficient 
performance is “prejudicial when counsel’s errors rendered the trial process 
fundamentally unfair” even if those errors probably did not alter the trial’s 
outcome.372 Even before Weaver, Maryland’s highest court relied on Strickland 
to hold that “[a] proper analysis of prejudice . . . should not focus solely on an 
outcome determination, but should consider ‘whether the result of the 
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.’”373 Since Weaver, a 
 
 367. Id. 
 368. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). This formulation is 
regularly adapted for other kinds of proceedings. For example, if a defendant who 
pleaded guilty alleges that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in advising him 
during the plea process, the prejudice inquiry requires the defendant to “show that 
there is a reasonable probably that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty.” See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). And if the allegation is that a defendant 
who received a death sentence had a constitutionally ineffective attorney at the capital 
sentencing hearing, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, absent the 
errors, the sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently 
reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
 369. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1911 (2017). 
 372. See Eve Brensike Primus & Justin Murray, Redefining Strickland Prejudice After Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/AR6Q-9TRP. 
 373. Coleman v. State, 75 A.3d 916, 928 (Md. 2013) (quoting Oken v. State, 681 A.2d 30, 44 
(Md. 1996)). 
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number of federal and state courts have similarly suggested that fundamental 
unfairness is an alternative way to demonstrate prejudice.374 
In Weaver itself, the Court did not find that the defendant demonstrated 
fundamental unfairness. The trial attorney performed deficiently by failing to 
object to a courtroom closure during voir dire, but the Court found no 
evidence that the trial was fundamentally unfair as a result. In particular, there 
was no evidence that a juror or any other court actor “failed to approach their 
duties with the neutrality and serious purpose that [the] system demands.”375 In 
short, the Court did not believe that the attorney’s deficient performance “le[d] 
to basic unfairness.”376 Nonetheless, the Weaver Court’s willingness to consider 
that question is potentially revolutionary because it suggests that defendants 
raising episodic personal ineffectiveness challenges may not need to show 
outcome-determinative prejudice to win. In Strickland itself, after all, the Court 
cautioned that the test articulated in that case should not be mechanically 
applied and emphasized that the ultimate question should focus on “the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding[s].”377 Weaver reflects that orientation, 
foregrounding the point that a showing of outcome-determinative prejudice 
may be only one of several ways to demonstrate the thing that a defendant 
obliged to show prejudice must establish: that the proceedings were 
fundamentally unfair. 
On the question of what other ways exist for demonstrating fundamental 
unfairness, state case law is instructive. Some states have interpreted the right 
to effective trial counsel under their state constitutions to mandate an inquiry 
into fundamental fairness rather than outcome-determinative prejudice. In 
New York, for example, once a reviewing court has determined that a trial 
attorney’s performance was deficient, the court “considers whether the 
defendant was afforded ‘meaningful representation.’”378 One way to show that 
the defendant was not afforded meaningful representation is to show that the 
trial attorney’s errors likely changed the outcome.379 But that is not the only 
way. A trial attorney’s ineffective representation may lead to a new trial in 
New York even when there is strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt, because 
the state’s “constitutional standard for the effective assistance of counsel ‘is 
 
 374. See Primus & Murray, supra note 372 (collecting cases). 
 375. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1913. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
 378. People v. Olecski, 59 N.Y.S.3d 888, 894 (Crim. Ct. 2017) (quoting People v. Henry, 744 
N.E.2d 112, 113 (N.Y. 2000)). 
 379. See People v. Canales, 972 N.Y.S.2d 316, 320 (App. Div. 2013). 
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ultimately concerned with the fairness of the process as a whole rather than its 
particular impact on the outcome of the case.’”380 
Under the “meaningful representation” standard, New York courts will 
consider “whether counsel made appropriate motions, set forth a cogent 
defense theory, interjected viable objections, conducted meaningful cross-
examination, gave an effective summation and otherwise presented a zealous 
defense.”381 The attorney must be “prepared on both the law and the facts.”382 
Importantly, the New York courts consider attorney errors cumulatively 
when asking whether there has been meaningful assistance.383 “[A] series of 
egregious deficiencies of a type that [a]re incapable of strategic explanation” 
can indicate a lack of meaningful representation regardless of whether the 
outcome was affected.384 After all, when trial counsel makes a series of 
unprofessional errors, it undermines the legitimacy and fairness of the 
proceedings because it reveals that counsel has “failed to approach their duties 
with the neutrality and serious purpose that [the] system demands.”385 
Given the Strickland Court’s language that the prejudice inquiry for 
episodic personal ineffectiveness claims should not be mechanically applied but 
should instead focus on “the fundamental fairness of the proceeding”386 and the 
Weaver Court’s recent suggestion that fundamental unfairness can exist absent 
a showing of a reasonable probability of a different outcome,387 it is time for 
lower courts to think more expansively about the prejudice requirement for 
episodic personal ineffectiveness claims (as a matter of both federal and state 
constitutional law).388 When a trial attorney fails to provide “meaningful 
representation” as a result of his or her deficient performance, the resulting 
trial is fundamentally unfair and reversal is warranted. 
Reviving the focus on fundamental fairness will encourage litigants and 
lower courts to think about the combined effect of multiple trial counsel 
errors. It will also resolve an important split in the courts about cumulative 
 
 380. Id. (quoting People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588 (N.Y. 1998)). 
 381. People v. Bush, 967 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (App. Div. 2013). 
 382. People v. Echavarria, 561 N.Y.S.2d 226, 227 (App. Div. 1990). 
 383. People v. Oathout, 989 N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (N.Y. 2013). 
 384. People v. Bartley, 748 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (App. Div. 2002); see also Echavarria, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 
227. 
 385. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1913 (2017). 
 386. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
 387. 137 S. Ct. at 1911. 
 388. See Jan Lucas, Case Note, A Cumulative Approach to Ineffective Assistance: New York’s 
Requirement That Counsel’s Cumulative Efforts Amount to Meaningful Representation; 
People v. Bodden, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1073, 1083-86 (2012) (noting that New York, 
Alaska, Oregon, Hawaii, and Massachusetts have adopted relaxed prejudice 
requirements). 
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prejudice inquiries. Lower courts are currently divided on whether the 
Strickland prejudice analysis must be applied in isolation to each individual 
alleged personal error that trial counsel made or whether trial counsel’s errors 
may be considered cumulatively to establish prejudice.389 A determination of 
whether the trial was fundamentally unfair requires a cumulative approach. 
Conclusion 
Litigants and courts have myopically focused on ineffectiveness that is 
personal and episodic at the expense of ineffectiveness that is structural, 
pervasive, or both. That focus is deeply problematic given the widespread and 
well-documented structural problems in indigent defense delivery systems. To 
make matters worse, the doctrinal test that courts apply in personal 
ineffectiveness cases is considerably more cramped than what the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in the area warrant. Litigants and courts should recognize 
that the right to effective assistance of trial counsel is entitled to more robust 
protection than it is currently given, even in cases where the violations are 
personal and episodic. And they should also expand their vision to recognize 
that personal and episodic ineffectiveness is only one of four forms of 
ineffectiveness—all of which should be redressed in court.  
 
 389. Compare Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a cumulative 
approach), with Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting a 
cumulative approach), Earls v. McCaughtry, 379 F.3d 489, 495-96 (7th Cir. 2004) (same), 
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), and Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 
F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). 
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